Approaching an investigation of multi-dimensional inequality

through the lenses of variety in models of capitalism by Antonelli, Gilberto et al.
 ISSN 2282-6483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approaching an investigation of  
multi-dimensional inequality through the 
lenses of variety in models of capitalism 
 
Gilberto Antonelli 
Pinuccia Pasqualina Calia 
Giovanni Guidetti 
 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°984 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Approaching an investigation of multi-dimensional inequality 
through the lenses of variety in models of capitalism 
 
Gilberto Antonellia, Pinuccia Pasqualina Caliab, Giovanni Guidettic 
 
Abstract 
 
After a synthetic presentation of the state of poverty and inequality in the world and the 
contradictions incurred by economic theory in this field after decades of globalization and in the 
midst of a persisting global crisis, in paragraphs 2. and 3. we outline the rational for our theoretical 
analysis, underlining two main aspects. First of all, in paragraph 2. we recall the reasons which 
makes inequality a multidimensional phenomenon, while in paragraph 3. we explore the reasons 
why the models of capitalism theory is relevant for studying multidimensional inequality. These 
paragraphs emphasise that inequality is a multidimensional and cumulative phenomenon and it 
should not be conceived only as the result of the processes of personal and functional distribution of 
income and wealth, which even by themselves are intrinsically multidimensional. The basic idea is 
that institutions, the cobweb of relations among them and their interaction with the economic 
structure define the model of capitalism which characterises a specific country and this, in turn, 
affects the level and the dynamics of inequality. This approach is consistent with the sociological 
approach by Rehbein and Souza (2014), based on the analytical framework developed by Pierre 
Bourdieu.  
In paragraph 4. we outline the rational for our empirical analysis, applying the notion of 
institutional complementarity and examining the relationship between institutional 
complementarity, models of capitalism and inequality. Besides, refining Amable’s analysis (2003), 
we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between inequality in income distribution and 
models of capitalism. Additionally, basing on cluster analysis, we identify six different models of 
capitalism in a sample of OECD countries, provide preliminary evidence on the different level of 
inequality which characterises each model and suggest that no evidence supports of the idea that a 
single model of capitalism is taking shape in this sphere in EU.  
In paragraph 5. we give some hints about issues in search for a new interpretation capable to fasten 
together the process of increasing inequality, the notion of symbolic violence and the models of 
capitalism theory. 
In the last paragraph we focus on conclusions useful for carrying on our research agenda. 
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1. Introduction 
The state of poverty and inequality in the world after decades of globalization and in the midst of a 
persisting global crisis is openly disclosed by UNDP (2013, 2014). While some fragile success has 
been achieved in terms of extreme poverty1, relative poverty2 and inequality looks out of control. 
At the world level the extreme or absolute poverty rate fell in 2010 to less than half the 1990 rate. 
The 1.A. target of the Millennium Development Goals was met five years ahead of the 2015 
deadline. This implies that 700 million fewer people lived in conditions of extreme poverty in 2010 
than in 1990. As suggested in the Report by UNDP (2013, p. 1), this result has been fostered by 
“impressive average gains against multiple indicators of material prosperity.”3  
Nevertheless, at the global level 1.2 billion people are still living in extreme poverty, with different 
trajectories in the different world regions.  
Moreover, if we truly think that poverty is a multi-dimensional and cumulative phenomenon, the 
overall scenario becomes more fuzzy and alarming. Following  UNDP (2014, p. 3) “Those living in 
extreme poverty and deprivation are among the most vulnerable. Despite recent progress in poverty 
reduction, more than 2.2 billion people are either near or living in multidimensional poverty. That 
means more than 15 percent of the world’s people remain vulnerable to multidimensional poverty. 
At the same time, nearly 80 percent of the global population lack comprehensive social protection. 
About 12 percent (842 million) suffer from chronic hunger, and nearly half of all workers - more 
than 1.5 billion - are in informal or precarious employment.”4 
When we come to consider recent trends in inequality the scenario get even worse. “The richest 1 
percent of the world population owns about 40 percent of the world’s assets, while the bottom half 
owns no more than 1 percent. Despite overall declines in maternal mortality, women in rural areas 
are still up to three times more likely to die while giving birth than women living in urban centres. 
Social protection has been extended, yet persons with disabilities are up to five times more likely 
than average to incur catastrophic health expenditures. Women are participating more in the work 
force, but continue to be disproportionately represented in vulnerable employment. Humanity 
remains deeply divided.”  
The optimistic scenario anticipated at the end of last Century by mainstream economists5 and 
international organizations6 has been radically overturned. Globalisation used to be thought good 
for the poor, the unemployed and the middle-class. But, the impact of the global crisis has deeply 
challenged this view, fostering new interest for inequality in policy makers, citizens and social 
scientists. And now the balance is bluntly described as follows. 
“Over the last two decades, income inequality has been growing on average within and across 
countries. As a result, a significant majority of the world’s population lives in societies that are more 
unequal today than 20 years ago. ... In fact, the sharpest increases in income inequality have 
occurred in those developing countries that were especially successful in pursuing vigorous growth 
and managed, as a result, to graduate into higher income brackets. Economic progress in these 
countries has not alleviated disparities, but rather exacerbated them. ... there are clear signs that this 
situation cannot be sustained for much longer. Inequality has been jeopardizing economic growth 
and poverty reduction. It has been stalling progress in education, health and nutrition for large 
swathes of the population, thus undermining the very human capabilities necessary for achieving a 
                                                 
1
 In the past, the absolute poverty line at the international level was next to $1 a day. From 2008 it has been revised by 
World Bank to $1.25 a day at 2005 purchasing-power parity. 
2
 Measuring relative poverty is akin to measuring income inequality, since it is related to the overall distribution of 
income or consumption in a country; for example, in OECD and EU the relative poverty line is set at an income level 
which is at 60% of the median household income. 
3
 Per capita GDP in low- and middle-income countries has more than doubled in real terms since 1990. In the same 
period, life expectancy in developing countries has risen from 63.2 years to 68.6 years. 
4
 Jessé Souza (2011) would probably include these persons in what he calls the “underclass”.  
5
 See for instance Sala-i-Martin (2002).  
6
 The reference goes, for instance, to the s.c. ‘Washington consensus’ view and the Davos World Economic Forum, 
especially in the 1971-2004 editions. 
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good life. It has been limiting opportunities and access to economic, social and political resources. 
Furthermore, inequality has been driving conflict and destabilizing society. When incomes and 
opportunities rise for only a few, when inequalities persist over time and space and across 
generations, then those at the margins, who remain so consistently excluded from the gains of 
development, will at some point contest the ‘progress’ that has bypassed them. ... But perhaps most 
important, extreme inequality contradicts the most fundamental principles of social justice, starting 
from the notion, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that “all human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights””. (UNDP, 2013, p. 1) 
 
Of course poverty and inequality are very different, even if not unrelated, concepts. The mainstream 
view oversimplifies the issue: “While it is unanimously agreed that poverty is bad, it is less clear 
that income inequalities are undesirable. After all, increases in inequality can arise from the 
worsening of the poor (a situation that is clearly bad) or the improvement of the rich (a situation that 
is clearly not bad).” (Sala-i-Martin, 2002, p. 1)   
Following this way of reasoning, it is rather common to distinguish between inequality in 
opportunities and inequality in outcomes. Much of the debate in development theory has been 
structured along these lines: the first is primarily concerned with factors that inhibit equitable 
outcomes, such as unequal access to employment or education; and the second with factors which 
influence the level achieved in various material dimensions of human success, such as income or 
education. While the latter is regarded as a standard result of economic and social life, and 
particularly of the competitive game, the former begets disapproval as an infringement of 
democratic principles. 
 
In any case, every judgement on inequality is extremely diverse for at least four indirect reasons. (a) 
Economies are going through deep transformations that are affected by outsourcing/unboundling 
and networks/value chains restructuring. (b) Economic and social classes are at the same time more 
and more fragmented, but less and less recognizable on account of specific roles performed in 
economic systems (and society in general). A range of income sources is available for the average 
worker, but these sources are not anymore necessarily linked to the factors of production the 
individual is endowed with. (c) Welfare perspectives vary according to the position held by the 
single agent in the household, in the society and in the networks in which she/he lives. (d) Different 
social and economic models of capitalism score rather different end results. 
At the same time, different layers of inequality are altogether relevant: (i) intra and inter 
generations; (ii) within and between genders; (iii) intra and inter countries (especially among DCs, 
Emerging Powers, LDCs); (iv) within and between local economic systems; (v) within and between 
employment categories (e.g., unions, professional associations); (vi) within and between social 
groups (e.g., economic, ethnic, religious groups); 
 
Indeed, we have to recognize, and the more so in the midst of a global crisis, that: (i) income 
inequality represents only one of the several dimensions of economic inequality; (ii) economic 
inequality may be determined by non economic inequality and generate further economic and non 
economic inequality7; (iii) also non economic inequality generates very important negative material 
and immaterial effects. All this makes less simple to find easy compensations to the economic and 
non economic costs of inequality. 
What's more, the global crisis in action is showing us that even basic elements we used to regard as 
engines for equality in opportunities8 can be easily transformed over time into “privileges” by the 
                                                 
7
 For instance,  a decrease in the incentive to invest in physical and human capital and an increase in social tensions and 
political instability may be driven by severe income equality. 
8
 For instance, the citizens right to a decent life, a decent work, education and access to information and knowledge; or 
the refugee's right to be protected against refoulement. 
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adverse circumstances. This leads to blurring the boundaries, which are shaped by economic, social 
and institutional behaviours and constraints, between what we could define a sustainable or 
unsustainable threshold of inequality. This can undermine the trade off between the bad and the 
good side of inequality. 
The overall scenario could change and, according to some authors9, the XXI Century could be 
characterized by the prevalence of the “patrimonial capitalism” pre-existing in XIX Century.10 
Since nowadays “Many people believe that modern growth naturally favours labour over 
inheritance and competence over birth” and “... democratic modernity is founded on the belief that 
inequalities based on individual talent and effort are more justified than other inequalities” (Piketty, 
2014, p. 237 and p. 241), this shock could bring about a dramatic change in this popular confidence 
and consequent expectations.11  
All this amounts to say that the very conception of inequality and its role in society is changing both 
in developed and developing countries and this change is strictly linked to its multidimensional 
character.12 
 
Therefore more than a single prescription derived from a mono-disciplinary perspective what is 
really crucial is the methodological assumption which is implied in the reconstruction of the nature, 
determinants and effects of inequality.  
The assumption should comprise four steps. In the first step, a multi-disciplinary approach is 
important because it allows to understand more of the different dimensions of social and economic 
problems, avoiding, in this way, the pitfalls arising from the adoption of a unilateral perspective. 
Secondly, the focus on the conditions of different countries at the world level (developed, 
developing, Emerging Powers) is also essential because, apart from helping to grasp the different 
specific perspectives, allows to understand interactions. 
In the third step, after the focalization on key research questions and real problems, each 
discipline13  can perform his proper task, making use of its specific tools of analysis. 
In the fourth and last step, multi-disciplinarity recovers a central role when we need to concentrate 
on policy design. 
The capability to pursue such an approach is decisive in order to reach original goals in the 
framework of the integrated cooperation programme we are implementing with the Global Study 
Programme. 
After the introduction, in paragraphs 2. and 3. we try to outline the rational for our theoretical 
analysis, underlining two main aspects. First of all, in paragraph 2. we recall the reasons which 
makes inequality a multidimensional phenomenon, while in paragraph 3. we explore the reasons 
why the models of capitalism theory (MCT)14 is relevant for studying multidimensional inequality.  
In paragraph 4. we try to outline the rational for our empirical analysis, applying the notion of 
institutional complementarity and examining the relationship between institutional 
complementarity, models of capitalism and inequality. Besides, refining Amable’s analysis (2003), 
we provide empirical evidence on the relationship between inequality in income distribution and 
models of capitalism.  
                                                 
9
 The most prominent is Piketty (2014). 
10
 In this respect the XX Century could have been the exception.  
11
 This perspective of study can be relevant also in trying to assess the effects of other global phenomena taking place in 
the present historical phase, such as “land grabbing”. 
12
 This means that the definition of inequality cannot be only economic and that it crucially depends among other 
factors on the actual performance of the social system in which human beings live and interact. 
13
 In our case, economics, sociology and law. 
14
 After some early work by Albert (1991) and Prodi (1991), non-mainstream economists like Amable (2000, 2003) and 
Aoki (2001), as well as sociologists like Crouch (2009, 2010), have developed a theoretical framework based on the 
notion of variety in models of capitalism, we will refer to as MCT. 
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In paragraph 5. we give some hints about issues in search for a new interpretation capable to fasten 
together the process of increasing inequality, the notion of symbolic violence and the MCT. 
In the last paragraph we focus on conclusions useful for carrying on our research agenda. 
 
 
2. In what respects inequality is multidimensional? 
Inequality, both at the macro-economic level, which refers to national and supra-national entities, at 
the meso-economic level, which refers to local communities, and at the micro-economic level, 
which refers to individuals and generations, is in its essence a multidimensional and cumulative 
phenomenon.  
 
Even when we split income inequality, which depends on the personal and functional distribution of 
income and wealth, from other sorts of inequality15 this phenomenon remains multidimensional, 
meaning that it evokes different types of individual and social background leading to the final 
outcome. One of the most important reasons is that inequality depends on wealth and income 
distribution and that “in all societies, income inequality can be decomposed into three terms: 
inequality in income from labour; inequality in the ownership of capital and the income to which it 
gives rise; and the interaction between the two terms” (Piketty, 2014, p.238). 
The relevance of ownership of capital and inheritance, which is strongly linked to the historical 
tradition, contributes to link economic inequality to the socio-institutional framework and the socio-
cultural perspective. Talent and effort in this case are less important than inheritance and marriage 
in determining success and this in turns implies different tastes and behaviours.16  
 
Just when we confine our research on inequality in income from labour, we have to be conscious 
that it can be derived from self-employment or wage labour, which imply totally different socio-
economic conditions, in which also the provisional or permanent character of employment 
contribute to differentiate the socio-economic background.  
 
Furthermore, economic inequality is critical, but, the more we explore the extremes of the 
distribution, the more we note an overlapping and a bumping up of different dimensions of 
inequality. Low per capita incomes are highly correlated with low quality of life, and therefore with 
variables like poor health, low education, higher uncertainty and insecurity of employment and low 
participation to civil society. Therefore, countries with low human development index (HDI) suffer 
most because they tend to have greater inequality in more dimensions (UNDP, 2013). 
 
Besides, following Marmot17 (2013), we can distinguish between the material deprivation, which 
entails malnutrition, exposition to infected organisms, low resistance to their effects, exposition to 
hot and cold weather and to toxic elements, and the processes conditioning adult mortality, which 
take place even when poverty thresholds are overtaken. In this case human capital and human 
development are affected by the living situation of the single person both in terms of their direct 
outcomes (life expectancy, productivity, income) and in terms of impact on their creation and 
destruction channels (education, healthcare).  
 
Another important implication is that a potential reduction in one dimension of inequality does not 
                                                 
15
 This practice has been favoured by the hegemony acquired by the neoclassical theoretical agenda in modern labour 
economics (Teixeira, 2003). This agenda, by the way, has greatly contributed to stress the mono-dimensional character 
of inequality with the human capital theory. 
16
 Also illegal accumulation of wealth and post-conflict transition phases can have some impact, in this respect. 
17
 This epidemiologist is laying the foundations of what can be defined social epidemiology, through the establishment 
of a systematic link between variance in health and life expectancy, on the one side, and social status, on the other. 
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imply an even reduction in all its dimensions.18  
The multidimensionality issue becomes more and more important as the awareness of the 
constraints caused by the existence of  a “maximum sustainable inequality threshold” (MSIT) for 
the economy increases. 19 
 
But, in order to pursue our argument in a more systematic way, it is convenient to investigate the 
different dimensions of inequality singling out its basic characteristics, its determinants and its 
effects. 
 
2.1. Nature 
In the last quarter of a century a deep rethinking on the notion of well-being is leading to a rising 
agreement on the idea that it arises “from a combination of what a person has, what a person can do 
with what they have, and how they think about what they have and can do” (IDS, 2009). 
Along this line of reasoning, well-being embraces three basic components: (a) the material and 
economic one, stressing welfare conditions, standards of living and economic values; (b) the 
relational one, emphasizing personal and social relations; (c) the subjective one, highlighting, moral 
values and perceptions, side by side with option and existence values. The three components are 
merged together and their boundaries are highly fuzzy (McGregor, 2007; Sumner and Mallett, 
2013). 
This, in turn, has induced a multi-layered revision of the notion of inequality, thanks to which 
nowadays also experience and intuition suggest that inequality is a multidimensional phenomenon: 
so many are its features and the circumstances in which it can be felt, conditional on culture, 
gender, ethnicity, religion, race, geographic location, age and other characteristics, relevant for 
human well-being, both across individuals and across groups. 
It is important to specify that the multidimensional nature of inequality concerns both each basic 
component per se and the connections between the three of them. We mean that, even separating the 
material and economic dimension from the others, and limiting ourselves to consider inequalities in 
each of the proxies for the standards of living, since this can concern variables such as income, 
wealth, education, health and nutrition, the multidimensional nature of inequality leaks out. Of 
course the multidimensionality becomes broader if the three basic components are allowed to 
interact. 
Among the non-economic components an essential role is played by ethnicity, gender and religion. 
In any case, beneath them, the access to many wants is often unevenly distributed and limited by 
economic constraints. Limiting ourselves only to very immediate examples, we could mention the 
option to use20 sophisticated drugs and cures, safe transports, qualified information and knowledge, 
natural and environmental resources of higher purity, and also a safe neighbourhood in which to rise 
children. Direct and indirect linkages connect material and immaterial components of inequality. 
Income constraints can easily bring about fragilities and drive persons to suffer from non-economic 
dimensions of inequality. 
The inequality in access to goods and resources and the limits to an inclusive growth process are 
often augmented by complementarities among goods and the increasing relevance of “network 
products”21 which characterize the actual conditions of consumption.  
Moreover, the increasing diffusion of non private goods, contrary to what could be envisaged, can 
contribute to increase inequality and decrease inclusiveness. It depends on the multiplicity of 
                                                 
18
 Even if this result is partly due to the  measures  used, a study by UNDP (2013) shows that in the last two decades at a 
worldwide level there have been much greater reductions in inequality in health and education than in income. 
19
 We can define MSIT as the maximum level of inequality not inhibiting inclusive growth in a given economic system 
(Antonelli, 2013). 
20
 Or even the benefit of knowing that a chance of utilization exists in the future. 
21
 For a comprehensive study see Shy (2001). 
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economic goods and the prevailing regulation structure for their provision.22  
In both cases the quality of consumption is conditioned by the ease of use of related conditions and 
externalities. 
 
2.2. Determinants 
When we come to consider the determinants of inequality we can easily realize how much the social 
and genetic components are able to influence the economic ones and conversely. Wealth, education, 
and social privilege are strongly interrelated with psychological temper and genetic privilege. 
At the personal and family level, a poor environment and natural gifts tend to lower the probability 
of economic success and to increase income inequality over the lifecycle. In fact, today, the 
majority of experts believe that behaviour and development are influenced by both “nature” and 
“nurture”23, while a minority take the extreme nativist or extreme empiricist views. However, 
researchers and experts still debate the degree to which biology and environment influence 
behaviour and performance. This suggest that the capability to take into account the interactions 
between the different dimensions of inequality is crucial. 
At the nationwide and, especially, at the meso-economic level, the welfare infrastructure and public 
policies can be very important in supplying concrete and timely assistance to disadvantaged 
individuals and families in local communities. To the extent that microeconomic studies observe 
critical and sensitive periods in the life cycle of individuals, indicating, for instance, that some skills 
are more easily acquired during certain stages, for most configurations of disadvantage it is 
important to socially invest relatively more in the early stages of childhood than in later stages 
(Cunha, Heckman and Schennach, 2010).24 Education, health care and social welfare services at the 
local level are therefore important drivers of the capability of a community to practice cohesion and 
civic virtues, with significant effects on the distribution of labour market performance and labour 
income opportunities. 
In this respect Adelman (2000, p. 18) adds another vital remark which is more appropriate in a 
meso-economic framework. “Cultural factors play a significant role in shaping institutions and 
societal responses to new challenges and opportunities. ... Both individualistic and communitarian 
cultures have advantages and disadvantages. … Individualistic responses foster innovation, 
dynamism, creative destruction and geographic and social inequality. … Communitarian responses 
foster social cohesion and the social ability to absorb change, and hence national resilience and 
malleability. They place a premium on social equity in growth outcomes and foster societal and 
governmental approaches to development. They also enable societies to more easily absorb short 
run decreases in personal welfare in the interest of the common long run good (Rodrik 1997, 
1998).”  
At the macroeconomic level, up to now the optimistic prediction by Kuznets (1955) was able to 
persuade the majority of the economic profession. Kuznets, using only U.S. data for the period 
1913-1948, suggested that in every country, over the course of industrialization and economic 
development, inequality follows a bell-shaped curve. In this theory inequality plays the role of an 
endogenous variable which is decreasing after a certain mean income threshold has been overtaken.  
In contrast with this view, Adelman (2000, pp. 14-18) stresses that fifty years of development 
history show how inequality can play the role of an exogenous variable which is negatively 
correlated with economic development. In these cases the relationship is reversed.25 
More recently, Piketty (2014, p. 15) adds that “... the magical Kuznets curve theory was formulated 
in large part for the wrong reasons, and its empirical underpinnings were extremely fragile. The 
                                                 
22
 For more details see Antonelli (2011). 
23
 Even if the two terms are rephrased more exactly. 
24
 For instance, the capability to timely support drug addicted young woman in the first years of age of their children 
can make social assistance much more effective in terms of inequality outcomes. 
25
 Adelman (2000, p. 17) answers: “Is there a Kuznetz curve?” And her answer is “Not in the sense that a U-shaped 
course of inequality is inevitable.”  
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sharp reduction in income inequality that we observe in almost all the rich countries between 1914 
and 1945, was due above all to the world wars and the violent economic and political shocks they 
entailed (especially for people with large fortunes). It had little to do with the tranquil process of 
intersectoral mobility described by Kuznets.”  
This dispute is of crucial importance in studying inequality, and, at least judging from the last 
evidence which has been made available, the final outcome can be very influential in stressing that 
the multidisciplinary focus on the issue and its multidimensional character are essential ingredients 
of scientific research. 
Another very controversial macroeconomic issue concerns the impact of trade liberalization on 
inequality.  
In the mainstream view, trade openness, monetary and fiscal policy, financial development and the 
rule of law are the more relevant determinants in explaining cross-country variation in growth rates. 
Under the assumption that growth is a process distribution neutral, the study of the impact of 
economic policies on within-country inequality can be split into two distinct phases: first, the main 
policies able to maximize the growth rate are identified; second, sign26 and absolute value of the 
elasticity of inequality or poverty with respect to growth can be estimated. (Berloffa and Segnana, 
2006, pp. 374-5).  
The second phase is relevant not only for evaluating the impact of growth policies on inequality and 
poverty, but especially in order to assess the sustainability of growth in the long run. Moreover, the 
key role played in the growth process by the legal structure, and particularly by the security of 
property rights and privatization, apart from allowing us to stress how composite is the nature of the 
determinants of growth and inequality even in the mainstream approach, is relevant also in order to 
assess the transferability of economic and institutional models in development, transition and 
reconstruction processes. 
However, empirical evidence shows that the growth process can be “highly distributionally non-
neutral”, as it has been argued by Kanbur and Lustig (1999, p. 8) and we shall see in paragraphs  
2.3. and 4.  
Furthermore, country specific conditions, which under appropriate circumstances may be ascribed 
to different models of capitalism, can make clear why the impact of the same policies is very 
different in terms of economic development and distribution of income and wealth or poverty. 
“Trade and accumulation policies are important in determining the spread-effects of growth and 
how growth and inequality interact. .... export-oriented growth in labor-intensive, consumer goods 
industries is equalizing because it raises employment and returns to labor unless specific policies 
are instituted to foster low wages. Also, when export-oriented growth is accompanied by low tariffs 
and low exchange rates, it turns agricultural terms of trade in favor of farmers and lowers consumer 
goods prices, with favourable distributional consequences.” (Adelman, 2000, p. 16) 
Thirlwall (2013, p. 4) extends the investigation range also to between-countries inequality and 
concludes that:  “... trade liberalisation almost certainly worsened the distribution of income 
between rich and poor countries, and between unskilled wage-earners and other workers within 
countries, contrary to the predictions of orthodox theory.” If the global scenario is only 
approximately similar to the one drafted in his recent book by Piketty (2014), this causal factor of 
inequality has to be taken seriously into account. 
Finally, vicious circles fostered by austerity traps27 can also arise which negatively impact on 
inequality. “... adjustment patterns to the debt crisis of the 1980s have varied significantly among 
countries (Balassa 1989). Some developing countries, mostly in Latin America and Africa, adopted 
restrictive import regimes, deflationary government expenditure and macroeconomic policies, and 
restraining wage policies, reduced subsidies, and liberalized their domestic markets to reduce their 
                                                 
26
 Which, coherently with the Kuznets curve, is assumed to be positive. 
27
 In this case, as also the recent evidence on European Union shows, countries that most ruthlessly cut their budgets see 
their overall debt loads increase as a share of the economy. 
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current account deficits, lower inflation, and increase competitiveness. For the countries that 
followed this path, this was a lost development decade, with substantial increases in poverty, 
inequality and characterized by low- growth, from which these countries have started to emerge 
only in the 1990s.” (Adelman, 2000, p. 8) The recent evolution of the most fragile European 
economies belonging to the EU can be interpreted along this line of thought. 
 
2.3. Effects 
Having so far stressed how much both basic characteristics and determinants of inequality are 
multidimensional, we cannot be surprised by the fact that also the effects of inequality share the 
same character.  
 
The relationship between inequality and growth or development has been examined, especially at 
the macro-economic level, by a number of authors proving that high initial levels of the former28 
may be  harmful to the second, in this way discarding the assumption that growth is a process 
distribution neutral.29 
 
Irma Adelman (2000) tried to single out the eight main lessons on the process of economic 
development experienced in half a century by developing countries, which has been understood as 
both multidimensional and highly nonlinear. In her view “The distribution of income is established 
mainly through the primary distribution of income that is generated by the production-determined 
circular flow” (p. 14) Moreover, “There is scope for choice in institutions, policies and in their 
sequencing, even at similar levels of development. The choices made, in turn, generate the initial 
conditions for subsequent development” (p. 6). Therefore, stages of development matter and 
different case studies, mostly East Asian30, suggest that equalitarian policies, pointing at the 
redistribution of the property of original factors of production (like land or education and human 
capital), led some countries to travel “the whole path from underdeveloped to developed, since the 
end of World War Two” (p.1). 
 
In general, looking at the overall picture in developed countries, we are led to take into account two 
equally relevant sides of the story. On the one hand, inequality and polarization of earnings31 can 
have strong negative impact on several crucial spheres of the economic systems, such as contractual 
disputes, social instability and transaction costs32. Even the solidity of a stable relationship between 
the different generations, which favour their cooperation to common goals, can be jeopardized, 
making more complex to reach agreements at the individual and collective level. Furthermore, 
inequality can be considered a concurrent cause of decline in the middle-class prominence, which is 
currently destabilizing the economic and social setting in different countries.  
On the other, inequality in performance and outcomes, can be regarded as a ordinary result of 
competition in everyday life, not conflicting with a sustainable growth. Therefore, in order to 
discriminate between physiologic and pathologic inequality and to assess to what extent this trade 
off risks to be unbalanced, an order of magnitude has to be ascertained. This is why it is appropriate 
to ask ourselves if does it exist and how can be measured what we could call MSIT for an 
                                                 
28
 Highly correlated with phenomena like: rent-seeking, social tensions, political instability, a poor median voter, 
imperfect capital markets and a small share of gross national income to the middle class, all of which lead to lower 
investment, higher taxation and lower economic growth. 
29
 For a comprehensive account see Berloffa and Segnana (2006). 
30
 Other countries, especially in Africa, Middle East and also Latin America, embarked on different paths, leading to 
widening inequality. 
31
 According to scholars, like Autor and Katz (2010), a phenomenon of “employment polarization” is  strongly 
characterizing developed countries. 
32
 Because of the increase in uncertainty about the prevailing institutional rules and the decrease in openness to share 
information. 
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economy.33 
Definition and measurement of this threshold are subject to two conditions. First, it should refer to a 
kind if inequality which violates equality in opportunities. Second, it should refer to a level of 
inequality which does not match with economic, social and environmental sustainability. 
This issue has been tackled, mostly indirectly by economic theory, in many different ways, even 
without knowing exactly at what level MSIT is positioned and more than that, even without being 
able to measure it in a comprehensive way. However, to the extent that a credible solution exist for 
the governance of inequality in the actual functioning and sustainability of an economic system, this 
option can be sufficient.34 
But this question cannot be worked around anymore when no credible solution exist. And the 
problem , unhappily, is that this is becoming more and more true. In fact even if for different 
reasons and with different severity, all the three main methods generally employed in the past for 
this purpose have been badly worsening their performance well before the end of the XX century. 
And when the main available gateways to the equity issue fail, this, by itself, makes more relevant 
to measure the actual value of MSIT. 
 
 
3. Why the models of capitalism theory is relevant for studying multidimensional inequality? 
Summing up the main conclusions reached in the previous paragraph, we may focus on three crucial 
aspects.  
(a) The debate on the fundamentals of inequality, signals its multidimensional nature and 
recommends high attention to the fact that different concepts and measures of inequality that have 
been utilized generates different results. Even the most apparently straightforward ones tend to 
retain a multidimensional nature and to refer to different domains pertaining to the overall economic 
and social system. 
(b) The dispute on the determinants of within-county inequality steer us to stress its  
multidimensional causes and to suggest that a non secondary role has been played by economic and 
institutional factors that are internal, area specific and local, together with the global and external 
ones. This implies that we have to take into account several forces interacting at the micro, meso 
and macro level in shaping the final achievement. 
(c) The study of the effects of inequality, apart from drawing attention to its multidimensional 
impact,  shows how crucial can be its initial level for subsequent development. At this layer the 
issue concerning the relevance and definition of a MSIT can be raised with significant implications 
for the sustainability and inclusiveness of economic growth. 
 
                                                 
33
 We can define MSIT as the maximum level of inequality not inhibiting growth in a given economic system.  
34
 Three have been so far the main methods experienced in the XX century to curb inequality over the years. All these 
methods are based on long term processes. Underpinning efforts at reducing economic inequality in all three cases was 
a recognition that social equality through equal citizenship had to be created. This meant that equal citizenship was 
created across genders, religions, castes, ethnicities and regions through law. Countries and societies in which those 
efforts have been made may not have achieved social equality enshrined in law fully, but that is the official benchmark 
they have established for themselves. An leading role of middle classes was crucial to this purpose. 
The more direct method has been focused on the redistribution of real assets. Therefore, land and educational reforms, 
nationalisation of industries and services where ways to create economic equity, not only in the socialist and communist 
countries, but also in the emerging capitalist ones. 
The second method, prevalent in the capitalist societies, was based on the redistribution of income through progressive 
taxation. The “welfare state”, by taxing the rich more and spending more in public goods aimed at creating a system of 
gradual, but sustained reduction in income inequality. 
The third method was shifting the burden to assure equity in the distribution of personal incomes to the mechanism of 
“compensating differentials” through private investment in human capital.34 
Even if for different reasons and with different severity these three methods where badly worsening their performance 
well before the end of the XX century. And when the available gateways to the inequality issue fail, this, by itself, 
makes more relevant to measure the actual value of MSIT. 
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Following this way of reasoning, we are led to think that the way in which different economic and 
social systems are able to evolve in terms of wide-ranging development and, more specifically, in 
terms of income and wealth distribution paths, which in turn strongly influence inequality, depends 
on four main pillars:  
(i) the baseline, that is the initial economic and institutional structure of each system; 
(ii) the capacity of each system to cope with and adapt to “natural” drift; 
(iii) the aptitude of each system to face and absorb global shocks; 
(iv) the capacity of each system to react to private strategies and public policies.  
 
On the whole, an appropriate theoretical framework for dealing with such complex phenomena 
requires the possibility to start from the analysis of the interrelated sub-systems from which overall 
outcomes derive.  
The basic idea is that the institutional architecture of each economic system promotes the adoption 
of some specific activities of innovation, while penalizing some others, through the establishment of 
complementarities involving enterprises and networks, macroeconomic regulation and functioning 
of goods, services and inputs markets, labour markets and channels of human resources education 
and training.35 The approach based on the idea that different models of capitalism determine the 
existing incentive structure and compete with each other is theoretically grounded and linked to the 
observation of real economic facts.36 Tax rates, benefit systems and access to the welfare system in 
the different models of capitalism can be rather effective in determining their performance in terms 
of inequality.37 
Varieties of capitalism are originated by variety in interrelated sub-systems, whose main  domains 
are the product markets, the labour markets, the financial markets, social protection, education and 
innovation. The support of a model able to nourish such an effort at the theoretical level is as much 
important as the availability of multidimensional indicators at the empirical one. And the main aim 
of the present paper is to begin to calibrate both components of our theoretical framework. This will 
be the task of part II. 
However, in what follows of part I we have to put forward two fundamental clarifications in order 
to avoid just as many fatal misunderstandings. 
 
The MCT recognizes a fundamental role to institutional structure in explaining the evolution of 
economic systems, but, and this is the first warning,  it cannot be confused with neo-institutionalism 
nor pan-institutionalism. 
The neo-institutionalist literature in economics tends to emphasize the endogeneity of institutional 
rules, the limits of economic policy and the boundlessness of institutional reforms when aiming at 
improving the performance of national economies.38 In this way it tends to ignore the complexity of 
interactions which determine their performance and swamp into pan-institutionalism. As suggested 
by Schettkat (2003) and Zenezini (2006), best practices are considered key research questions and 
dominant prescriptions also in the realm of institutional architecture.39 
                                                 
35
 See also Antonelli (1997).  
36
 Common features of this approach with the study of the German “social market economy” (in German, “Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft”) can be found. 
37
 For instance, according to different statistical sources, while economic inequality shows an increasing trend for 
English speaking countries, India and China, this is not true for continental European countries and Japan, nor for the 
Mediterranean and Scandinavian countries. 
38
 While Douglas North (1990) seems open to a semi-endogenous explanation of institutions, Gary Becker  (1993) is 
not. 
39The conclusion is that institutional settings are probably relevant in terms of distributional effects, but scanty and not 
easily detectable in terms of overall efficiency and aggregate performance. The evidence presented in several empirical 
studies, according to Zenezini (2006), Freeman (2000) and Howell and Huebler (2001), does not support the theoretical 
approach endorsed by (IMF, 2003, p. 129) for which “the causes of high unemployment can be found in labor market 
institutions”. By extension we could argue that not even the MCT is capable to directly explain the aggregate 
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While in the literature on models of capitalism even if a model cannot be defined without 
institutions, because they shape and regulate the interactions between agents, institutions play the 
role of resources as well as constraints. 
This difference can be better assessed if we consider that in the neo-institutionalist literature40 the 
economic structure interacting with the institutional one is straightforwardly based on the general 
equilibrium theory and the theoretical model is neutral with respect to the empirical setting. 
Therefore the step of empirical investigation becomes a purely descriptive application of this model, 
the rules derived from the best practices becomes universal and the “rule of law” is all over 
transferable. 
This is not true for the literature on MCT. In this case, first of all, the institutional complexity is  
accommodated in the model through the notion of “interrelated sub-systems” and 
complementarities are not necessarily positive, leaving ground for failures. Moreover, this literature 
does not pretend to explain all kind of performance of economic systems, and, what is more 
important, it is based on a different theory of economic structure. Its main assumptions turn out to 
be the following: 
(i) non optimality of the final configurations (no single best solution can be achieved); 
(ii) diversity in micro, meso and macro objectives prevails; 
(iii) redundance and resilience are considered as much important as effectiveness; 
(iv) real economic interdependences are relevant for describing the economic structure; 
(v) income distribution and inequality are not explained completely in an endogenous way. 
In this manner institutional structure and economic structure are always interacting for at least three 
basic reasons. First, economic structure and institutional structure relate at the same level of 
abstraction and institutions cannot be interpreted simply as empirical artefacts or ad hoc elements  
relevant only when we come at the applied stage of research. Second, the behaviour of agents 
coherent with the economic assumptions is shaped by the action of “institutional entrepreneurs” 
(e.g., élites, policy makers at the different levels of government and governance) in the making of 
institution building. Third, scarcity of economic resources conditions very often the mandatory 
character of the institutional rules and fundamental rights are reshaped as law in books rather than 
law in action. 
 
The search for complementarities or codetermination between institutional structure and economic 
structure becomes the core purpose of scientific research in an approach based on two 
methodological assumptions:  
(a) institutional rules, legal codes and constitutions are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for 
cohesion and sustainability of economies and societies;41  
(b) institutional rules, which are essentially varied and partial, derive from different value 
judgements  associated with different cultures and specific historical backgrounds42. 
 
The second warning is tantamount crucial since it makes clear that focusing on interrelated 
subsystems does not amount to believe that mechanical and deterministic forces dominates the 
interactions. Apart from the relevance of the stochastic components, the multiplicity of potential 
                                                                                                                                                                  
performance of labour markets as a residual outcome of a logical sequence in which labour markets comes last. 
However, the latter can explain distribution and inequality effects to the extent that a certain degree of exogeneity in one 
of the distributional shares is assumed.  
40
 Reference could be made to the economics of discrimination by Becker (1957). 
41
 For instance, if a person get sick up against famine or child labour and fights in favour of a “decent work agenda”, 
this is not because it exists a law prohibiting them, but for ethical reasons that hopefully are the precondition for new 
institutional rules. 
42
 E.g., even within EU variety is binding. Dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens' rights, and justice are the 
titles included in The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (2010). However, the Charter's provisions do not extend 
to the competences as defined in the EU Treaties and the EU cannot intervene in fundamental rights issues in areas over 
which it has no competence. 
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outcomes does not allows us to enfold in few and arbitrary categories the set of final configurations 
taken by each economic system. This statement can be better understood if we focus on the 
meaning of complementarity and match it with an applied example. 
The notion of complementarity is manifold and, contrary to what may be thought, its most 
appropriate meaning in MCT refers to the occurrence of mutually compensating components rather 
than of reciprocally reinforcing components or similarities.43 Therefore, to the extent that balancing 
characteristics in one way or another are better describing institutional complementarities in MCT, 
determinism is prevented to exercise a significant role in it.  
The example refers to the balanced complementarity taking place in these months between the 
channelling of a relevant amount of households savings in Germany towards internal financial 
investments with very low return44 and the pro-deflation policy pursued by Bundesbank. If inflation 
goes up in order to comply with the pro-growth policy, which is complementary to the needs of 
Southern Europe countries, this will damage the purchasing power of German households that 
where led to choose these kinds of financial investments thorough the path dependence generated in 
the German financial system in the earlier phases of the global crises. This example shows how 
even in the case of the variously revered German model complementarities are not always the result 
of convergence of best practice institutions. Moreover in the next paragraph we shall see how this 
can have a negative impact on other member countries of EU. 
The ever-changing taxonomies arranged for describing the different models of capitalism can be 
interpreted as provisional outcomes of a theory in search of more comprehensive models and of 
greater ability to work out this challenge. The taxonomy can change in each given point of time and 
overtime because models of capitalism can evolve through the transformation of complementarities. 
 
 
4. Rationale for empirical analysis 
 
4.1. Institutional complementarity as a tool of analysis  
The notion of institutional complementarity plays a pivotal role in both the analysis of varieties of 
capitalism and, more in general, in the analysis of the role of institutions. The latter point seems to 
be quite obvious, but it is not. In these last thirty years standard neoclassical economics has worked 
out a lot of models which incorporate the existence and the working of institutions and their 
influence of economic performance. Basically, in these last thirty years the great bulk of 
neoclassical labour economics can be interpreted as the development of models which deviate from 
the standard model of perfect competition due to the existence and operation of a specific 
institution, giving rise to a sub-optimal equilibrium. If one considers the debate on labour market 
flexibility in European economies it seems quite difficult to deny this statement; most of standard 
approaches used to explain involuntary unemployment as the consequence of specific institutional 
settings, which prevent the labour market from adjusting with respect to unbalance between labour 
demand and supply.45 The analysis of the effects of the functioning of a single institution, regardless 
of how this institution interacts with other institutions, is a consequence of the methodological 
approach of standard microeconomics, in which the analysis focuses on the direct effects of the 
single institution, neglecting the complementarity relationships that the institution establishes with 
                                                 
43
 As suggested by Crouch, Streeck, Boyer, Amable, Hall and Jackson (2005, pp. 359-363), these two notions coexist 
with the notion employed in the economic theory of consumption for distinguishing between substitute and 
complementary goods and with the general notion of similarity. The first one shares with that focusing on mutually 
compensating components the notion of completion through compensation.  
44
 In 2012, according to Eurostat data, 80% of the 4,700 billion euro savings where invested in deposit accounts, 
retirement accounts  and bonds with negligible returns. 
45
 One could develop this paragraph talking about theories of real wage rigidity, such as the efficiency wage hypothesis 
or the insider-outsider model. 
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other institutions46.   
However recent developments in the field of institutionalist analysis have focused on the interaction 
between two or more institutions and has led to introduce the notion of institutional 
complementarity. We can have institutional complementarity when two or more institutions interact 
so that the working and the performance of the institutions involved in this relationship is affected 
by the working and the operation of the others.47 Basically, the operation of a single institution 
reinforces and is reinforced by the functioning of other institutions.  
Even on the basis of the functionalist interpretation of institutional complementarity, there are two 
important consequences of institutional complementarity: (ii) possible prevailing of sub-optimal 
configurations of institutions and (ii) path dependence. 
(i) Aoki shows that when two institutions are complementary this configuration can be stable even 
though, if compared to another configuration of complementary institutions, it results to be sub-
optimal. 
(ii) the existence of complementary relationships can cause institutional lock-in and path 
dependence. Applying the notion of path dependency developed in the field of evolutionary 
economics by Arthur (1994) and David (1994), Kang (2006) shows how institutional 
complementarity can bring about path dependency since it implies four mechanisms which are at 
the basis of path dependency: (a) large set-up costs or initial costs for the agents affected by the 
operation of the institutions; (b) learning effects; (c) coordination effects; (d) adaptive expectations. 
This entails the absence of a single best institutional combination. 
 
In this framework it is very important to understand, first of all, who are the institutional builders.48 
Following Streeck (Crouch, Streeck, Boyer, Amable, Hall and Jackson, 2005), the political élites 
acts as founders of specific institutions. It is very important to identify the composition of these 
élites and the mechanisms through which these élites contribute to the process of institutional 
building. Second, we need to know who are the agents whose action is affected by the operation of 
institutions. For some agents the institution can be considered as a set of constraints and rules of the 
game (à la North), for others institutions can be resources. It is very important to understand the 
objective functions of these agents. Third, we need to understand how the operation of 
complementary relationships can be influenced by exogenous factors. At this point, in neoclassical 
economic theory one would try to define the objective function to maximise subject to a specific 
resource constraint. Sticking to this approach, one can say that the institutional entrepreneurs would 
set up institutions in order to take the maximum feasible advantage from the foundation of the 
institution itself.  
Using a more general language, it is important to understand which “ex-ante” purpose the 
institution pursues. Basically, that means that it is important to understand why a specific institution 
has been set up and its dynamics. However, it is important to emphasise that, unless we assume the 
existence of a “homo economicus”, gifted with unlimited capability to work out the outcomes of 
her/his actions and choices, the effects of a process of institutional building may well differ “ex-
post” from what the institution was “ex-ante” designed for. This is a consequence of the 
complementary relationships which can be established among a bundle of institutions; the setting up 
of a specific institution affects the sub-system for which it has been conceived and, through the 
                                                 
46 For example, as to the effects of the laws concerning the firing restrictions, the standard approach focuses on the 
capabilities of firms to adjust the level of employment in order to reach the optimal equilibrium. This analysis rules out 
the effects, of this legislation on the propensity of firms to provide training for their employees, emphasised by Soskice 
and Hall (2001). This side of the analysis can be caught only if one takes into account the complementary relationship 
among institutions. In the standard microeconomic neoclassical approach, institutions are conceived as deviation with 
respect to an institution-free equilibrium. 
47
 See Aoki (2001) for a formal definition using a game theoretical approach. 
48
 Or the “institutional entrepreneurs”. 
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complementary relationships established with other institutions, it can affect other sub-systems.49 
In the process of institutional building, different institutional entrepreneurs, with possible 
contrasting objective functions, can be involved either in the setting up of the same institution or in 
the assembly of interacting institutions. This process follows a trial and error procedure pursued by 
agents with limited rationality, in a highly uncertain environment. As a result, institutions do not 
necessarily establish optimal relationships and, actually, can hinder each other. Even though they 
are neglected in the literature, in this respect we can refer to the establishment of “negative 
complementary relationship”. However, the alleged negativity/positivity of a set of institutional 
complementary relationships depends on the objective functions of both individual agents and the 
whole social system. For example, let us consider a certain framework of institutional 
complementarity promoting the compression of the relative wage structure. Can we deem this effect 
satisfactory, neutral or negative? We cannot reach a definite answer.  
 
4.2. Complementarity and models of capitalism 
 
A model of capitalism is a cobweb of complementary institutions which affect the performance of a 
socio-economic system, based on capitalistic relationships among agents. This definition is 
consistent with Amable's approach who maintains that “a variety of institutional complementarities 
is possible, generating a diversity of models of capitalism (Amable, 2003, pp. 102). 
Amable points out five different types of institutional domains: (a) product markets; (b) labour 
markets; (c) financial system; (d) social protection system; (e) educational system.  
As institutions affect the distribution of income among wages, profits and rents through the 
structuring of both the labour markets and the markets for goods, services and productive factors, 
the model of capitalism defines the distribution of income. Starting from this point of departure, we 
can state that different models of capitalism should exhibit different level of inequality in income 
distribution. From this, following the Bourdieu's framework of analysis, inequality in access to 
education, health services arise. It is important to stress that the definition of a model of capitalism 
is based on the operation of a set of institutions and does not imply an interpretation about the 
functional relationships among economic variables which define an economic model. Of course, 
this does not mean that the model of capitalism is neutral as to the relationships among economic 
variables, but simply that the model of capitalism is defined regardless of any economic model.  
 
We could mention institutional change as a consequence of change in the environment, in the agents 
affected, in the operation of the institution and/or in their objective functions. Contrary to Amable's 
statement that “institutional forms x and y are compatible if their coexistence does not set in motion 
a process of institutional change, in the sense that some political forces would like to keep x and 
change y”, when there are negative complementary relationships we might observe the start of an 
institutional change only if one of the institutional entrepreneurs prevails on the others or if the 
institutional entrepreneurs reach an agreement for a change.  
 
As institutions are linked together by complementary relationships, then the effects of institutional 
building can be properly appraised only taking into account the cobweb of complementary 
relationships which can be potentially activated with the introduction of a new institution. An 
institution is not efficient only “per se” but also in accordance with the relationships established 
with the operation of other institutions.50 In any case, important questions remain open: can we 
analyse the effect of structural adjustments prescriptions enforced by IMF through the perspective 
of institutional complementarity? can we interpret the failures and, especially, the negative side 
                                                 
49
 The example can be made of labour laws regulating hiring and firing and propensity of firms to provide training for 
their employees. 
50
 In paragraph 5. we will try to develop some ideas concerning the EU evolution.  
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effects of these policy through the lens of institutional complementarity?  
 
 
4.3. The empirical analysis 
 
4.3.1. The research targets 
After discussing the pivotal role played by the institutional complementarities in the definition of 
the models of capitalism, we have to test the empirical relevance of this analysis. The analysis 
proceeds along two different stages.  
First of all, we have to verify that by using a set of indicators of the operation of institutions and  
their complex interactions, we can classify different countries into distinct groups, each one 
corresponding to a model of capitalism.  
Secondly, assuming that the previous stage of empirical analysis is successful, we have to see if the 
classification introduced discriminates significantly the countries as far as income inequality is 
concerned.  
Basically the research questions we are going to address through empirical analysis are the 
following: 
(i) Is the approach followed by MCT, which defines models of capitalism on the basis of 
institutional complementarities, empirically robust? 
(ii) Does income inequality depend on the model of capitalism or is it an inherent characteristic of 
capitalism itself with more or less similar thresholds everywhere? Of course, the question does not 
refer to the existence itself of income inequality in capitalistic societies, which one should take for 
granted, but to the degree of inequality in income distribution. 
 
Empirical analysis is based on two distinct steps. The first step consists in an application of cluster 
analysis in order to identify empirically the models of capitalism. Once we have defined the various 
models of capitalism, we proceed to the second step in which we estimate the relationship between 
inequality and model of capitalism.  
 
 
4.3.2 Cluster analysis and models of capitalism 
 
First of all, we have refined Amable's (2003) classification of the five sub-systems51. He points out 
the five domains mentioned earlier and, given the relevance of technological change in labour 
market dynamics, we have decided to add a set of indicators concerning the degree of technological 
development of a country and the role played by both the private and the public sector in activities 
of R&D.  
Following (Everitt, Dunn, 2001, pp. 125) cluster analysis provides a “parsimonious way of 
describing the patterns of similarities and differences in the data”. Basically, this means that through 
cluster analysis one can group different statistical units and classify them. However, as Everitt and 
Dunn state, we have to remember that “any classification is simply a division of the objects or 
individuals of interest into groups based on a set of rules – it is neither true or false (unlike, say, a 
theory) and should be judged largely on its usefulness” (ibidem, pp. 126).  
Each cluster groups a set of countries which, on the basis of a series of statistical indicators, 
outlined in the Appendix, exhibits a high degree of homogeneity among them and a corresponding 
high degree of heterogeneity with the countries grouped in other clusters. More details on cluster 
analysis can be found in Appendix. 
 
 
                                                 
51
 He uses the term domains. 
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4.3.2 1. The data 
 
All the data used for the cluster analysis come from the OECD.StatExtract, the database set up by 
OECD and the World Development Indicators (WDI-WB), collected by the World Bank52.  
For each institutional domain (Labour market, Product market, etc.) we try to recover data for each 
year in the time span between 1995 and 2010 for the maximum number of countries. The final set 
of indicators used in the analysis is the result of the process that try to minimise the loss of 
information on countries and, at the same time, to retain the maximum possible number of years. 
However, it was impossible to obtain complete time series for all the years between 1995-2010 for 
all indicators and all the countries. So we decided to implement the analysis at two specific point in 
time: at the beginning and at the end of the period (1995 and 2010). The definition and the source of 
indicators we used in the analysis is reported in Table A.1 in appendix 
For the analysis of income inequality, we have used an estimate of Gini index (gini_net) of 
inequality in equivalized (square root scale) household disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) income, 
using Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data as the standard. This datum comes from Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) provided by the university of Iowa.  
Following Liskanen (2007), the LIS disposable income concept is given by gross income (GIW) minus 
mandatory contributions and income taxes. In terms of income variables, it can be expressed by means 
of the following equation:  
 
LIS_DPI = GIW – CONTRIB – INCTAX 53 
 
As far as the selection of countries is concerned, the complexity and the richness of data required 
for the empirical research has forced us to focus the analysis on a selection of 24 OECD countries, 
which refer to: (a) 19 European countries - Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, 
Hungary, Ireland, Switzerland and United Kingdom; (b) 2 Asian countries - Japan and Korea; (c) 2 
American countries - Canada and the United States; (d) 1 country from Oceania - Australia.  
The composition of the sample of countries is strongly Eurocentric, despite it includes some 
important extra-European economies.  
One of the most remarkable limits of this analysis is the exclusion of both developing countries and, 
especially, the so-called Emerging Powers (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). As a 
partial justification for this limitation, of which we are aware, we can say that data availability for 
these countries can be rather problematic.  
 
 
4.3.2.2. The cluster analysis 
 
In order to identify whether different models of capitalism exist, we apply the cluster analysis to the 
institutional indicators of the 24 countries for which we have data at 1995 and 2010. We select the 
maximum set of indicators common to both periods. Before applying the cluster analysis, we 
proceed to standardize the raw data in order to eliminate the influence of the different measurement 
units. 
In Tables 1 and 2 the cluster composition in 1995 and 2010 is presented. The choice of the number 
of cluster in each year are based on the dendrograms shown in Figures 1 and 2, and the measures 
reported in Tables A.2 and A.3 in Appendix.  
 
 
                                                 
52
 See the Appendix for the list of statistical variables used and the source. 
53
 Roughly speaking Gross Income can be defined as the flows of earnings of productive factors plus the pensions plus 
transfer income. For a precise definition see Niskanen (2007).  
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Table 1. - Cluster composition – 1995 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Czech Republic, 
Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, 
Spain, Hungary, 
Ireland 
Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, 
Sweden 
Austria, Belgium, 
France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands 
Japan, 
Switzerland, 
Korea 
Australia, 
Canada, United 
Kingdom, United 
States 
Data source: our elaboration on OECD data  
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Figure 1. - The dendrogram based on 1995 indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. - Cluster composition - 2010 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Czech 
Republic, 
Poland, 
Slovak 
Republic, 
Hungary 
France, 
Ireland, 
Netherlands, 
Portugal, 
Spain 
Denmark, 
Finland, 
Norway, 
Sweden 
Austria, 
Belgium, 
Germany, 
Italy 
Japan, Korea Australia, 
Canada, 
United 
Kingdom, 
United States, 
Switzerland 
Data source: our elaboration on OECD data  
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Figure 2. - The dendrogram based on 2010 indicators 
 
 
 
 
In the following we try to characterize the different groups found by the cluster analysis for each 
time period and compare the differences in the grouping and the characteristics across time. We start 
from the results of the cluster analysis for the year 1995, so we can compare our results to the 
grouping in Amable (2003) for the late ‘90.  
Using data at 1995, two clusters are clearly identified as the ones that correspond to the two 
opposite models of capitalism identified by Amable (2000, 2003): the market-based capitalism 
model (or Anglo-Saxon economies) that corresponds to the cluster composed by USA, Canada, 
Australia and UK, and the Social-democratic model, which corresponds to the cluster composed by 
the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden). In addition to those clusters,  
a cluster with Japan and Korea, associated by Amable to the Asian model, emerged in our analysis. 
However, in our analysis this cluster includes  Switzerland, which in Amable’s analysis can be 
found in a cluster with other continental European countries.  
The main differences between our cluster analysis and Amable’s one can be identified in the 
composition of both cluster 3 and cluster 1.  
Cluster 3 is associated to the model of Continental European Capitalism. Although the composition 
of the cluster in our and Amable’s analysis is similar, there are a few  exceptions. For example, in 
our analysis Norway is classified in the cluster that identify clearly the social-democratic model 
while Amable classifies this country together with France, Germany, Austria, Belgium and 
Netherlands (plus Switzerland and Ireland). Moreover, we have found that Italy is in a cluster with 
Germany and France, while Amable groups Italy with Spain, Portugal and Greece  in a cluster 
collecting all the most Mediterranean countries. Finally, in our analysis one can observe the rising 
of a cluster (cluster 1) including Spain, Portugal and Ireland as well as  four European countries 
from central and eastern Europe (former socialist-block countries) that were never considered in 
previous empirical analyses.  
As already stressed by Amable (2003), even though the identification of clusters allows to group 
countries into homogeneous subsets, that does not mean that one cannot observe a certain degree of 
heterogeneity among countries of the same cluster, as far as certain variables are concerned. 
Therefore, each cluster identifies a specific Model of Capitalism, which can be considered as a sort 
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of ideal-type, however countries belonging to the same cluster can significantly differ as to certain 
variables.   
In describing the clusters we look at the cluster’s average for each indicator (Table A.4.) and 
consider a measure of the level of heterogeneity between clusters and homogeneity across countries 
within clusters. This is based on the share of the between-cluster variability (deviance) of each 
indicator on total variability: it measures how much of the total variability depends on  differences 
among clusters, and so it indicates the characteristics that mostly discriminate the clusters (Table 
A.5.).  
Cluster 6 is characterized by a deregulated product market, since we can observe low values of the 
indicators of Product Market Regulation (PMR ) – State control, Barriers to entrepreneurship, and 
Barriers to trade and investments. As to labour market, in this cluster countries present  low values 
of the Employment Protection indicators, little coordination or centralization for wage bargaining, 
and low value of trade union density. Interestingly, these countries have a sophisticated financial 
system, with high stock market capitalization on GDP, highly dispersed banking systems, 
significant presence of foreign banks and a relevant domestic credit on GDP. In this cluster social 
protection is poor and the welfare system is less developed; social public expenditure on GDP is 
quite small in comparison to the other clusters. The same can be said for  unemployment benefit  
and the incidence of public expenditure on passive labour market policies. This group of countries 
exhibits high level of gross domestic expenditure in R&D on GDP and a high number of researchers 
among employees. Finally, one can observe what happens to the indicators related to the working of 
the fiscal system. In this cluster both the level of taxation on GDP and the value of the tax wedge 
are lower than in other clusters (with the exception of  cluster 4). This framework is confirmed  by 
the structure of revenues by the different sources of taxation: taxes on income, profit etc. accounts 
for the 46% of total taxation, while the amount of social security contribution on total taxation 
accounts only for the 14%.  
At the other end of the range of clusters cluster 2, which includes the Scandinavian countries and  
Denmark. This cluster fits in with the social-democratic model of capitalism, characterized by a 
highly developed welfare system with the highest social public expenditures and high values of 
other welfare indicators (public expenditures on unemployment, public expenditure on passive and 
active labour market policies). Labour market is characterized by the highest participation in trade 
union and a high value of the indicator of coordination and centralization of wage bargaining, as 
well as a stringent employment regulation, even if not as strict as cluster 3. This cluster also 
presents high values of the level of taxation The financial system is highly concentrated with a low 
presence of foreign bank. Besides, the system of Research and Development is quite competitive 
because this cluster presents  one of highest value of Gross domestic expenditure in R&D on GDP  
and the highest number of researchers on total employment.  
Cluster 5, composed by Japan, Korea, and Switzerland, is close to the cluster 6 in many domains 
and it is the most distant from the social-democratic model. It is characterized by low level of social 
protection, low public social expenditures and a low level of taxation on GDP and on labour. The 
labour market is more regulated than the market-based model with a certain level of employment 
protection, especially for temporary employment, and a high level of coordination and 
centralization of wage bargaining but a very low participation in trade unions. It differentiates most 
from the market-based model regarding the product market regulation, with high levels of State 
control and different type of barriers. The financial system is well developed, with high value of all 
indicators concerning the stock market and limited banking concentration, but it differentiates for 
the major role of the bank system (the highest indicator of domestic credit provided by banks). It is 
also characterized by a R&D system with high investment, provided especially by the private 
sector, and a high number of researchers on total employment.  
The other two clusters are somewhere in  between the two extremes and are similar in some respect. 
Cluster 3 groups the countries that in the Amable’s analysis were associated to the continental 
European capitalisms, with some exception (Norway, Italy and Ireland). This cluster is characterised 
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by a high level of employment protection (especially for temporary employment) coordination and 
centralization of wage bargaining and trade union density. In addition to that, one can observe a 
high level of social protection, especially of employment-based benefits. The product market is 
quite regulated, with higher level of state control and barriers to entrepreneurship compared to the 
others clusters. The level of taxation is very high, especially on the labour factor. Hence, in many 
aspects this cluster is close to the cluster of the Scandinavian countries. The difference lies  in the 
domain of education and R&D. In fact, both the level of public expenditures on education (% of 
GDP) and the Gross domestic expenditure in R&D on GDP are the lowest among all clusters. The 
same can be said as far as the number of researchers on total employees is concerned. 
Cluster 1 is a novelty with respect to the analysis of Amable, due to the presence of some countries 
that were not previously available. We recognise a group of eastern European countries, and other 
three countries (Ireland, Portugal and Spain) that were classified differently in previous analyses. 
This cluster is close to cluster 3 with regard to many aspects. It has a strict employment protection 
(less for temporary contracts) and a comparatively low level of coordination and centralization of 
wage bargaining. Participation in trade unions is not so high as in the former cluster. In addition to 
that, countries in this cluster have a limited welfare state with a lower level of social protection than 
the previous cluster but higher than the “market-based” cluster. Product markets are strictly 
regulated and the financial system is characterized by a high concentration of the banking system 
and a small and not too much efficient stock market. The level of taxation is comparable to cluster 3 
but the structure by type of taxation evidences a higher incidence of “indirect” taxation rather 
“direct taxation”. Finally, one can observe both very low levels of investments in R&D and in the 
number of employees working in R&D activities.  
However, the description hides the within-cluster heterogeneity across the countries because we 
compare the clusters’ averages. Indeed, we find that while for some indicators the clusters are well 
differentiated and, to some extent, homogeneous inside, for others still remains high heterogeneity 
within clusters. This emerge from the data in Table A.5: differences between clusters are well 
accounted by a small number of indicators, for which the between-cluster deviance is greater than 
65%. For many indicators the within-cluster deviance is greater than 50% of the total deviance, 
indicating that there is a substantial heterogeneity within clusters.  
The time lag between 1995 and 2010 is long enough to leave room for structural change and for 
radical institutional transformations to occur, which can shift one country from one model (cluster) 
to another one. Indeed, the situation at 2010 shows a greater diversification, above all for the 
European countries: now we can clearly distinguish a cluster of Eastern European countries (cluster 
1) and a new cluster (cluster 2) is formed putting together some countries that were previously 
allocated to two different clusters. This may also be revealed by looking at the share of between-
cluster deviance, that is higher than 65% for a greater number of indicators. 
The clusters differentiate mostly on institutional indicators related to the labour market, the fiscal 
and financial system and the system of drivers of technological innovation. Looking at Table A.6, 
which shows the cluster mean of each indicator, we notice there are large differences in trade union 
density, with the highest value for the cluster that includes the North European countries (cluster 3) 
and the cluster with Austria, Germany, Italy, and Belgium (cluster 4), and the lowest values for the 
Asian countries (Japan and Korea - cluster 5) and the Eastern European countries (cluster 1). We 
observe a quite similar pattern for the degree of coordination of bargaining, with the exception of 
the cluster of Japan and Korea, which is closer  to the cluster of North European countries. 
There are also large differences  in the incidence of labour taxation and the level of the statutory 
minimum wages. Tax wegde is wide especially for cluster 4 (Austria, Germany et al.), and the 
North European countries, as well as for Eastern European countries, while cluster 6 (Australia, 
Canada, UK, Switzerland, and USA) and cluster 5 has  lower values of tax wedge than the former. 
Consistently with the previous pattern, these  two clusters have the lowest values of minimum wage 
in comparison, for example, to cluster 1 or cluster 2. The small value of this indicator for cluster 3 
and 4 is due to the fact that in the majority of those countries there is no minimum wage.  
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Taxation also varies greatly between clusters. Regarding the share of income, profits etc. taxes on 
total taxation, for two clusters (cluster 6 and 3) total taxation flows come largely from direct 
taxation while there is a better balance between different sources of State revenues for the other 
clusters. The lowest value is observed for cluster 1 (Japan and Korea). However, as far as total 
revenue on GPD is concerned the lowest share is observed for the cluster of Anglo-Saxon countries 
and the Asian countries, while all the European countries  have larger levels of taxation, in 
particular  cluster 3 and 4, which also have the highest values of average tax rate. Very different 
welfare systems characterized the clusters: especially low values of Gross Replacement Ratio 
(GRR) are observed for the cluster of Eastern European countries and the cluster 5 (Japan and 
Korea) while, as expected, the highest benefit for unemployment are in the Northern European 
countries but also in cluster 2 (composed by a variety of countries: Spain, France, Portugal, Ireland, 
and Netherlands). The same pattern is evidenced for Total Public Social Expenditures and Total 
Public Expenditures on passive labour market policies. 
There are quite large differences in the level of Stock Market Capitalization to GDP, with the 
highest value in cluster 6 – the Anglo-Saxon countries – and the lowest value in cluster 4 and  in 
cluster 1 (Eastern European countries). Finally, other influential indicators are the two indicators 
related to the technological level of the economic system: the Northern European countries (cluster 
3) and Japan and Korea (cluster 5) exhibit the highest levels of investment in both R&D and human 
capital, while the Eastern European countries have the lowest values for both these indicators.  
From this descriptive analysis, one can draw some conclusions.  
First of all, we find that the empirical support of the diversity of capitalism pointed out in Amable is 
largely confirmed. It is worth mentioning that  it is not possible to identify a single European model 
of capitalism. The 19 European countries are split along five different clusters in both years. In 
addition to that, one can say that, with the exclusion of the United Kingdom, in 1995 the European 
countries were distributed among three different clusters, whereas fifteen years later the same 
countries were split into four different clusters. Apparently, this suggests that no process of 
convergence was at work in Europe in that period of time.  
As far as Europe is concerned, the interpretation of cluster analysis with 2010 data suggests the 
existence of the following clusters: (i) a group of formerly centrally planned economies; (ii) a group 
of Scandinavian countries and Denmark; (iii) two clusters of continental countries which, in these 
fifteen years of interest, passed through a stage of institutional restructuring, which, however, did 
not imply any dynamics of convergence.  
Second, an Anglo-Saxon model can be detected whose composition seems to be quite steady. Third, 
a stable cluster, which includes the two Asian countries, can be observed . 
 
 
4.3.3 Models of capitalism and inequality. Some preliminary empirical evidence 
 
In order to understand whether each cluster differs from the others as far as income distribution is 
concerned, one can estimate the following econometric model: 
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The dependent variable (ginii,t ) is a Gini index of income distribution for each one of the 24 
countries. Clusteri (where i= 1,2…5) is a dummy variable indicating the cluster of each country, 
based on cluster composition of 2010. Cluster 6 is the benchmark.  
This preliminary econometric analysis shows some interesting results. First of all, considering that 
the cluster 6 is the benchmark of this straightforward model, one can observe that all the parameters 
are negative and highly significant; from a statistical point of view this means that the six clusters 
are statistically different as far as inequality in income distribution is concerned. The negativity of 
the signs for all the coefficients indicates that the cluster 6 (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, 
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United States and Switzerland) shows the highest degree of inequality in income distribution. It is 
important to remember that the higher is the absolute value of the coefficient related to the variable 
Clusteri, the lower is the degree of inequality in income distribution. Therefore, one can state that 
the countries belonging to cluster 3 (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) evidence the lowest level 
of inequality in income distribution, whereas countries belonging to Cluster 2 (France, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) seem to be the closest, as far as income distribution is concerned, 
to the economies of cluster 6. Quite interestingly, the countries with formerly centrally planned 
economies (cluster 1, i.e.: Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic and Hungary) show, at least in 
comparative terms, a low degree of income inequality.  
 
 
Table 3 - Pooled OLS, using 384 observations - included 24 cross-sectional units - time-series 
length = 16 Dependent variable: gini_net 
 
 coefficient std. error  t-ratio  p-value  
Const 32,4952 0,311187 104,4  7,30e-281 *** 
Cluster 1 -5,15039 0,466780  -11,03  9,96e-025 *** 
Cluster 2 -1,86836  0,440085 -4,245 2,75e-05  *** 
Cluster 3 -8,61819 0,466780 -18,46  1,03e-054 *** 
Cluster 4 -3,97942 0,466780 -8,525 3,70e-016 *** 
Cluster 5 -2,30250 0,582177 -3,955 9,14e-05  *** 
     
Mean dependent var 28,95608 S.D. dependent var    3,968614  
Sum squared resid 2928,361 S.E. of regression    2,783341  
R-squared  0,514546 Adjusted R-squared    0,508125  
F(5, 378)   80,13052 P-value(F)            3,53e-57  
Log-likelihood  -934,9310    Akaike criterion      1881,862  
Schwarz criterion  1905,566 Hannan-Quinn          1891,264  
Rho  0,959376 Durbin-Watson                     0,034028  
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Graph 1. The dynamics of income inequality1995-2010 (cluster 2010)
 
The straightforward econometric analysis can be watched through Graph 1. This graph shows the 
dynamics of inequality in the period 1995-2010, given the 2010 composition of clusters. 
Interestingly, we can observe a remarkable level of stability as far as the relative ranking of each 
cluster is concerned. Especially, as to European countries, the classification obtained through the 
cluster analysis seems to discriminate effectively the diverging performances of the countries in 
terms of income inequality. 
 
 
5. Issues in search for a new interpretation 
 
Three are the filters we have used for selecting the issues analysed in this paragraph. First, they 
must be related to the process of increasing inequality in some regions of the world. Second, MCT 
can be helpful in investigating it and therefore alternative solutions are available when choosing 
between different models of capitalism. Third, the notion of “symbolic violence” can contribute to 
improve the interpretation of their evolution in society. 
In the case of the first two filters, we have already done some work which can be of some help for 
the present analysis.54  Even if we should stress the fact that the MCT has been worked out 
especially for comparing different models in a given point of time and investigating especially the 
distinctive characteristics of each model. While in our view a similar effort should be performed in 
studying also how specific models can evolve over time, and  the impact of the evolution of each 
model on the sustainability of the others. A joint result of the latter effort could be relevant also in 
order to explore the attractiveness of established models on emerging powers and developing 
countries. 
 
Moreover, for two of the issues considered in this paragraph we will make use of the metaphor of 
converging margins in the theory of plate tectonics. As suggested in (Antonelli, 2014), the theory of 
plate tectonics identifies three types of dynamics: (a) diverging margins, which separate the plates 
moving away one from another while shaping new earth crust in correspondence to oceanic ridges - 
in this case the plate boundaries are defined ridges; (b) converging margins, along which two plates 
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 For instance, see Antonelli (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). 
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are moving toward each other and their match originates the immersion of a plate under the other or 
the collision between the two plates - in this case the plate boundaries are defined  trenches; (c) 
transforms or conservative margins, along which the two plates slide horizontally one with respect 
to the other. Trenches are destructive plate margins, while ridges are constructive plate margins.55  
Applying this metaphor to the evolution of economies, we can infer that without an early 
implementation of ambitious strategies of change in the economy and institutions, the economic 
structure can accumulate damaging effects on the sections less regulated or dealt with as residuals. 
 
But the most complex task for economists and statisticians like us is to correctly deal with the very 
controversial notion of symbolic power or symbolic violence, which stem from philosophy and 
sociology and that, at least at first sight, could lead to an undue intrusion in different disciplines in 
which we do not have enough knowledge.56 
A non arbitrary link between economic and sociological conceptions can perhaps be found through 
the notion of human capital. Following the suggestion of Portes (1998, p. 5): “The closest 
equivalent to human capital in Bourdieu’s analysis is embodied cultural capital, which is defined as 
the habitus of cultural practices, knowledge, and demeanors learned through exposure to role 
models in the family and other environments” (Bourdieu, 1979). In this case Bourdieu seems to 
critically adjust a concept focused years in advance by the Chicago economists.  
Another relevant thread is offered by one more comment of Portes (1998, p. 3), according to whom 
we owe the first systematic contemporary analysis of social capital to Bourdieu, who defined the 
concept as “… the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or 
recognition. (Bourdieu 1985, p. 248; 1980)”. 
Since for Bourdieu inequality in modern society is due to unequal access to scarce resources, both 
in their material and immaterial meaning, all the three different types of capital (“economic”, 
cultural and social) distinguished by him are relevant in interpreting inequality. 
Social conflict rest very often on unequal access to resources and inequality. They can be engaged 
by a huge array of conflicting actors depending on the object of interest. Local and global social 
classes can be involved in them as well as different groups at variance with culture, gender, 
ethnicity, religion, race, age, sport and further characteristics.  
Usually our interest is focused on dichotomic actors, like middle class and “underclass”, 
incumbents and challengers or dissidents, immigrants and autochthons, heterodox and heretic. 
European economic literature has paid a lot of attention in the last decades to the insiders-outsiders 
dichotomy.  
Put in this way, social conflicts are managed and solved not always by means of a rational, cost-
benefit, framework, but in an “opaque and subtle way” (Souza, 2011) which can be explained in 
terms of symbolic domination. As argued by Bourdieu (1979), symbolic domination or symbolic 
power is crucial in determining how hierarchies of power are structured and reproduced across 
societies. It is understood as the imposition of categories of thought and perception upon dominated 
social agents who, once they begin observing and evaluating the world in terms of those categories, 
perceive the existing social order as fair. This perpetuates the social structure which is favoured and 
serves the interests of the dominant agents. Therefore, symbolic power is much more powerful than 
physical violence in that it is embedded in the very modes of action and structures of cognition of 
individuals and legitimates the current social order. 
 
5.1. Labour markets in the EU and middle class decline 
The case of labour markets in EU can be relevant in explaining how different models of capitalism 
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 Further clarifications can be found in Condie (2003). 
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 At the same time, we have to plainly recognize that the discussions within the GSP research team led us to 
acknowledge the relevance of this notion and of the background notions of capital in Bourdieu thought.  
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interact and how inequality works through middle in Europe.   
The economic systems in which labour markets operate in Europe are structurally diverse and this 
reflect the variety of regional economic systems and the persistence of different models of 
capitalism.57  
It is not possible and realistic to achieve, at least in a reasonable time interval, a unique labour 
market in Europe. Even in a more homogeneous institutional context different labour markets 
would continue to operate and this would generate several interactions among the diverse segments 
belonging to different countries. Moreover, the structural heterogeneity of European regions do not 
assist solutions devised mainly to take into account average behaviours of representative agents. In 
this respect, the adoption of a different approach, capable in allowing for the actual differences 
among diverse models of capitalism can help. This is true, also because in the European context it is 
long time that more models of capitalism are confronting themselves in a not much transparent way. 
This new approach allows for the recognition of the various relationships of action and reaction 
(feedback effects) which explain the linkages between labour markets, markets for goods and 
services and markets for production factors, innovation systems and institutions that discipline, both 
at the macro and micro-economic level, the different models. The diversity in the procedures which 
regulate these relationships bring about the variety among the economic systems which coexist 
within Eurozone and EU. Moreover, the way in which these subsystems are reciprocally related 
shape the different capability to react to the vicious dynamics of under-investment in human capital, 
stressed by Reich (1991). 
On the other side, the inclusion of diverse labour markets in different models of capitalism helps in 
diminishing their residual character and strengthen their governance without ignoring their variety. 
In addition, it assists in exploring differentiated solutions, some of them transitory and other 
permanent, but all conceived in an evolutionary perspective. Furthermore, the possibility to 
compare different models of capitalism58 and let them compete with each other synchronically and 
evolve diachronically do not exclude further convergence processes and new solutions not yet 
predictable. 
An important institutional feature distinguishing different models of capitalism can be found in the 
contractual condition and lay-off rules which are distinctive of the case law considered. When  
open-ended contracts prevail in labour markets these are related to totally different production 
organizations and financial institutions with respect to when fixed term contract prevail. Of course 
innovations bridging the gap between the two models can occur, but it is evident that the second 
setting requires perfect or quasi-perfect equilibria and passive flexibility in labour markets. 
However, an overload of flexibility in labour markets, especially for the young persons, can 
discourage both the family, the worker and the firm to invest in general and specific education and 
training activities. This, in turn, may discourage innovation activities and investments.59 In very 
critical circumstances and in the long run passive flexibility and labour income uncertainty fostered 
by it can even determine human capital destruction, contradicting in this way the strategy of 
escaping the vicious dynamics of under-investment in human capital. 
The capability to conceive the different subsystems as diverse models of capitalism may entail some 
advantages. The more so if the perspective of analysis includes both the synchronic and the 
diachronic dimensions. The diachronic dimension can be crucial both in finding new convergent 
paths and in assessing that old paths are not anymore sustainable for the future. For instance, on 
these grounds we could scrutinize if in our time the s.c. “Mediterranean model of capitalism” can be 
relevant in solving the integration issues while preserving the original characters of the 
Mediterranean regions or, rather, some of these characters could be better preserved through a 
transition to another model of capitalism which is more sustainable. 
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 For further clarifications, see Antonelli (2014). 
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 For example, through an formal exercise of open method of coordination (OMC).  
59
 With reference to the Italian labour market see Bugamelli M., Cannari L., Lotti F. and Magri S. (2012). 
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To give credit to the idea that the economic structure of the European regions is too diversified to be 
able to hold out at the same time the Euro system and a single and exclusive model of capitalism, 
and that, at least in certain cases, labour markets can fail in generating a stable equilibrium, means 
to live room to a diverse regulation of labour markets able to reduce the overall entropy and 
facilitate the identification of more sustainable intermediate trajectories.  
This helps in clarifying, once for all, that the comparison among different regions, when 
implementing and evaluating EU policies, is to be made paying attention not mach to the average 
values but to the variances of the key variables. In this way, comparisons at a regional scale are 
privileged and functional aggregations in terms of “macro-areas” or “Euro-regions” are eligible. 
Moreover, since greater realism in the perception of economic policies at a supra-national level is 
allowed, the risk of systemic failure can be diminished and the wiggling competition among models 
carried out in the last two decades dismissed 
Further advantages of the approach can be derived from its conceptual and analytical rigour. As a 
result, the definition of models of capitalism can help even in better categorizing and measuring 
labour markets. Moreover, it can help in screening the impact of different types of flexibility on 
development perspective of different sectors: for instance in the manufacturing industry recovery. It 
could also help in devising how to protect the choice of developing production activities from 
conflicting interests and appetites of the financial hubs that are taking off in EU countries, investing 
in different models of capitalism and exploiting at a full range the advantages of financialization of 
the global economy. 
The phenomenon of converging margins in plate tectonics suggests that, when plates are 
converging, their contact can determine the immersion of one plate under another one or the 
collision between the two plates, that is an earthquake.60 When we use this analogy in the sphere of 
the European integration process these two consequences can be paralleled to two possible negative 
outcomes of this process. In the first case the process can lead to a demise of one of the converging 
parties, which is swallowed up by the other. In the second one it can lead to a breakdown of both 
parties and possibly to a systemic failure, and at least to a systemic risk. The third possible outcome, 
the only positive one, is not predicted in plate tectonics, but could be carried out in a political and 
institutional setting, being aware that the other two negative outcomes are not impossible and under 
some circumstances even more likely than the positive one. 
In our view, the phenomenon of “employment polarization” and consequent middle class decline, 
which in Italy has taken the form of “detrimental convergence”61, can be better explained using this 
theoretical framework. 
As already said, the ability of European regions and countries to face and solve in a cooperative 
way the problems deriving from their inner structural imbalances is crucial in motivating the 
interest of regions and countries of the global South for the European strategies of integration. 
Moreover, the changeover to an explicit comparison and competition among different models of 
capitalism does not exclude a potential long term convergence toward a unique model to the extent 
that the diachronic evolution may let emerge actual and prospective net benefits of each model both 
within the Eurozone and the EU. 
 
5.2. Flexicurity in European and Italian experience 
As we have seen in the introduction, the good side of inequality is strongly connected to the 
successes of competition and flexibility is one of its final outcomes. 
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 When the stress typology is considered, which is due to the different actions happening along the plates, three types 
of rupture mechanisms can be detected for earthquakes: direct or relaxed faults; reverse or compressive faults; 
translation faults. All possible combinations of these faults can occur. 
61
 Observing the pattern of change in employment shares by wage terciles in the last fifteen years, the employment 
growth in Italy concentrates only on the job opportunities in high-wage and probably high-skill jobs. Job opportunities 
both in low-wage and probably low-skill jobs and in traditional middle-wage and probably middle-skill jobs have 
decreased (Autor and Katz, 2010). 
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When we come to interpret the term competition, which is a kind of interaction between human 
beings crucial for economic growth and development as well as for economic success, again we can 
argue that its patterns and intensity are shaped by the institutional characteristics prevailing in the 
different models of capitalism in which they live.  
John Kenneth Galbraith (1969, p. 96) maintained that in what he named the “conventional 
wisdom”: “The desire for economic security was long considered the great enemy of increased 
product. This attitude was firmly grounded in the belief that the insecurity of the competitive model 
was essential for efficiency. ….. Plainly, however, the notion that economic insecurity is essential 
for efficiency and economic advance was a major miscalculation - perhaps the greatest in the 
history of economic ideas. ... In fact the years of increasing concern for economic security have 
been ones of unparalleled advance in productivity.”  
Galbraith, in criticizing the conventional wisdom, was taking advantage of the establishment of the 
high-volume manufacturing in the US and its capability to create “millions of jobs that swelled the 
ranks of American middle class” (Reich, 1991, p. 48). Nowadays the limited and polarized 
capability to increase the volume of jobs by the economies of developed countries drive us to 
consider an utopia the Galbraith’s assessment: the match between insecurity and competition seems 
to have recovered a never-ending vigour.  
However, insecurity fosters inequality and this trade-off seems to be evident in the historical 
experience of several developing countries (Adelman, 2000; Thirwall, 2012). 
On the one side, we need competition in order to achieve a good economic performance but, on the 
other, we became aware that inequality, as a by-product of competition, can be unsustainable above 
certain thresholds and economic policies and appropriate institutions are essential in order to attain 
inclusive growth. 
Since, however, social dumping and “competition from below” dominate the economic scene, we 
have to confront ourselves with the “dark side” of competition and not to appease ourselves with the 
fundamental theorems of welfare economics. And when we turn to the term social dumping, first we 
focus on a term “dumping” that has been carefully chosen to blame unfair practices of foreign 
traders. “It was said that foreigners were “dumping” their wares in the United States – a term 
conjuring up images of huge piles of substandard consumer durables and cheap novelty items 
littering American beaches.” (Reich, 1991, p. 71)  
Then, considering the attribute “social”, we realize that it refers to many practices used by 
employers to hire cheaper labour, through both migrant workers and off-shoring, but, in absence of 
recognized “global legal standards” the precise nature of this unfairness is rarely stated with some 
specificity.  
Consequently, governments have been tempted to enter a “social policy regime competition” 
through which they would lessen their labour and social standards in order to reduce labour costs on 
enterprises and to attract business activity within their jurisdiction. (Crouch, 2009) An unsaid 
threshold of the social dumping which is considered sustainable is implied in this approach. In this 
way “competition from below” is allowed by the “conventional wisdom”. 
Furthermore, what can be said about the raw production factor called “labour” applies also to the 
“broader production factor” that we could call “human resources” or “human capital”.62 At the same 
time, what is true for human resources is true also for the other “broad production factors”: that is, 
environmental and natural resources, on the one side, innovation, technological change and physical 
capital, on the other. Social dumping occurs with reference to all broad production factors and often 
can take advantage from exploiting linkages and synergies between them.  
If this reconstruction of the relationship between inequality, competition and social dumping is 
suitable, “legal global standards” should be defined at a world level in order to balance the mix 
between these components in a sustainable way for both developed and developing countries. In 
this way they would become a prerequisite of sustainable development. Under the aegis of the 
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“decent work agenda” ILO has implemented several programmes at the global, regional and 
national levels.63 Particular attention has been paid to equal remuneration, the elimination of racial 
discrimination and better enforcement of legislation in general. 
Since this is well known from many years, together with the severe risks faced by many countries in 
the case of an overload of flexibility in labour markets compromising human capital creation, we 
could wonder why the EU suggests as a best practice the “flexicurity model” which has been tested 
only in a small, wealthy, non Euro zone and, in this respect, unrepresentative country like 
Denmark?  And why “outsiders”, at least in countries like Italy, seem to accept a reform of the 
labour markets which tends to equalize their condition with that of “insiders” in a general frame of 
reduced job security and tenure cutback? 
 
As far as the Italian situation is concerned, we can maintain with ISFOL (2013) that the 
deregulation of labour markets policies, implemented from the beginning of the ‘90s, did not led to 
improve neither productivity, nor job creation, or wages. Liberalization and disproportionate use of 
short term contracts and other forms of temporary works aimed at implementing more flexibility in 
labour markets initially rather rigid. But, while reducing the legal protection of some worker 
categories, they were not able to enhance, on the supply, side neither sales volumes of the firms nor 
job creation, on the contrary they even contributed to raise the cost of labour per product unit. At 
the same time, they have increased inequality, reduced the demand for consumption and worsened 
the crisis from the demand side.  
 
A candidate explanation is that during the long phase of decline in economic conditions, preceding 
the global crisis, the misconduct of public and private sectors coupled with twisted mass 
communication,  led many young outsiders to accept the view that they have been deprived by old 
insiders, understood as employees with tenure64, and impersonal mechanisms based on competition, 
meritocracy and flexibility are more fair. 
 
5.3. Migration between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea 
The economic prospects of the Euro-Mediterranean Countries (EMCs) are uncertain, not only due 
to the long-lasting effects of the global crisis, social turbulence, political unrest and war, but also 
because of the impact of long term structural changes in the international division of labour and the 
shortage of political and institutional tools pre-arranged by EU and the international community at 
large.  
The sequence of events taking place from 2011 in the Southern shore of the Mediterranean sea asks 
Europeans to reconsider the integration process, taking into account the new challenges and the 
deep interactions between the Northern and the Southern shores as well as to implement new 
priorities and regional economic unions.  
We may even say that, after all, at least some of the many determinants of the “Arab spring” were 
not unpredictable. For sure, what has been called the “fever under the skin” of the Arab world heads 
to a brand new stage of development. 
As it has been the case with the transformation of the Eastern-Central Europe Countries (ECECs) 
after the fall of the Berlin wall, the puzzle of the present crisis reflects many of the factors acting at 
a global scale: the impact of long term fragmentation in trade and production; the emergence of new 
economic powers; the changing composition of the population and of the working force. 
In fact, if we take into account the proper time lag, we may note clear similarities between the 
ongoing transition of the ECEC and the potential transformation of the Arab League Countries 
(ALCs). 
                                                 
63
 Nondiscrimination has been included as a priority in the Decent Work Country Programmes of 36 countries. (ILO, 
2011) 
64
 Possibly organized in unions. 
  30   
 
For instance, the number of countries in each group is similar (27 countries and 22 respectively); 
the two groups of countries are similar in the size of projected population in 2030 (384.7 and 412.8 
million), even if the latter exhibit a higher speed of growth and the median age is much lower. 
Of course strong differences are also present: while the EU first comers countries are all included in 
the group with a very high HDI, the ECEC are concentrated in the group with high HDI and the 
ALC are mostly distributed between the high HDI group and the low HDI group. But this can be 
also consistent with the assimilation of the present events to a new transition process. 
However, the key question is: how a new transition is likely to take place if EU, in 
competition/cooperation with the US, will not invest enough in it? 
Structural and behavioural changes are now taking an accelerated speed, following a long run trend 
pre-existent to the global crisis: scale effects in many spheres of economic life (e.g., availability of 
broad production factors, production and trade); diversification in the models of capitalism; variety 
in economic leadership (e.g., China, with its 38,800 workers in Libya evacuated in quick time, but 
also Brazil as observer state in the Arab League, are very influent in the Mediterranean area); 
supply of new financial sources (e.g., sovereign funds from Saudi Arabia and Libya). 
In labour markets deep changes are taking place on a multi layers basis: (i) in the composition of the 
labour force by age groups and generations; (ii) in the composition of the labour force by gender; 
(iii)  in the composition of the labour force by educational qualifications; (iv) in the composition of 
the labour force by geographical origin; (v) the level of inequality is high and increasing. 
Higher education graduates do not seem to represent anymore the main tool for shifting the 
production frontier. They are becoming, together with upper higher education diploma holders, the 
majority of the working force in the more advanced countries, and in the developing countries as 
well. The economic, but also the social and political role of education is changing over time. 
This brings about several key research questions. Are labour market adjustments to be still 
conceived as the residual to the economic integration processes? Which role is played by mismatch, 
over-education, under-utilization of qualified manpower? Do we experience complementarities or 
substitution between the workforce of the two shores? To what extent labour markets governance 
can be one of the main determinants in regional integration processes? 
 
The capability of European regions and countries to face and solve in a cooperative way the 
problems deriving from their inner structural imbalances should be coupled with the capacity to 
solve internal problems with an outward oriented approach.  
With reference to labour markets and social convergence, three are the main implications. First, 
complementarities in demographic growth and labour force participation with the South 
Mediterranean regions and other regions of the global South should be explored, especially as far as 
future professional needs are concerned,  in order to make the most of positive externalities. 
Second, educational and training initiatives at the various stages of the life cycle65 should be started 
on both sides of the Mediterranean shores in order to improve design and regulation of international 
flows of migration. The participation of business organizations would be a key component of these 
initiatives aiming at bridging the gap between the two shores. Third, regional cooperation plans 
concerned with the implementation of a new geography of jobs could be tested. Regional networks, 
involving not only neighbouring partners, could be engaged both in an offshore and inland creation 
of new job opportunities in the relevant sectors. 
Of course many constraints limit the European capability to face this big issue. But why, instead of 
engaging thoroughly in it, the main matter of harsh political debate has become the Mare Nostrum 
operations in the Mediterranean sea? And why the local governors of the continental regions of 
Europe, while neglecting international rights and benefits incoming with the migrants human 
capital, argue about the suspension of the Schengen Treaty, aiming at excluding, rejecting and 
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expelling migrant workers? Social tensions and hardening attitudes towards migrants lead to 
widespread discrimination and populist policies take advantage of this fostering greater xenophobia 
and discrimination directed towards migrants. 
Also in this case a candidate explanation can be perhaps found in the day by day game of symbolic 
dominance played by immigrants and lower-middle class autochthones in which the former 
frequently interiorize the interests of the dominant agents.66 
 
5.4. Does it exists a leading model for Emerging Countries? 
Accepting variety in the way capitalism institutionally organize its functioning in different regions 
of the world does not amount to admit that no common structure lies beneath all capitalist societies. 
Financial capital and also cultural capital and social capital tend to preserve common fundamentals 
in each model.  
Not even it can imply the acknowledgment that each model, once born, can be sustainable and able 
to persist for ever. We have seen that within each model an evolution can take place over time and 
this evolution can be influenced by the interactions between the different models of capitalism. 
However, the joint action of the synchronic and diachronic dimensions makes the analysis very 
complex for reaching clear cut results at this stage. Intuition can be of some help, but is also subject 
to multiple mistakes. Therefore, for the time being no easy answer can be reached.  
In any case, the competition between the different models can be expected quite strong due to the 
frictions caused by the combination of common fundamentals with diversity in interrelated sub-
systems. Moreover, the competition is fostered by the conviction that a zero sum game is being 
played.  
If we apply to the interaction between developed countries and emerging powers the metaphor of 
converging margins in the theory of plate tectonics (Antonelli, 2014), we can reach, at least in 
principle, similar results compared to those we can reach when applying it to the EU scaffold.   
 
Starting from highly differentiated economic conditions, the Emerging Powers are confronted with 
a triple corners’ choice. On the first corner, each one of them could be driven to imitate the model of 
capitalism prevailing in the developed countries with which they are connected in terms of trade 
and economic interdependences. On the second one, each one of them could be pushed to adapt to 
the model of capitalism which is perceived as nearer to their starting conditions, in order to simplify 
the traverse path and maintain more autonomy.  On the third corner, each one of them should take 
carefully in consideration the reciprocal interdependencies with the other Emerging Powers, and, 
more generally, with the global South. 
Therefore, if, on the one hand, more degrees of freedom in adapting their economic policies to their 
strategies are available to Emerging Powers compared with EU, on the other, they can suffer more 
heavy  constraints in terms of global interdependence feedbacks. 
Apart the always possible occurrence of diverging or transforms/conservative margins, which 
sounds as rather optimistic in the midst of a global crisis, we can easily predict that the case of 
converging margins will prevail. 
In this case, it is also easy to foresee that the most damaging effects will accrue, even for Emerging 
Powers, to the sections of their economic structure less regulated, or dealt with as residuals, in the 
adopted strategies. In particular no monetary zone can be designed without coherent strategies of 
convergence in labour markets. 
Moreover, positive-sum game outcomes, which are not predicted in plate tectonics, could be carried 
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out in the political and institutional setting, but they require prudent and proactive foresight, long 
term planning and competent governance. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
From this articulated paper it is quite complicated to draw some synthetic conclusions, as it is full of 
possible paths of development for future research both from a theoretical and an empirical 
perspective. Therefore, one has to limit to draw only few conclusions in order to focus the attention 
on some highly relevant and selected problems, considering that this does not exhaust the possible 
issues which can be taken into account. In our opinion one can work out two distinct levels of 
discussion as a conclusive stage of this paper; a methodological level, based on the methodologies 
adopted and the theories introduced and furthered and an empirical level, based on the non-trivial 
results obtained in the quantitative analysis.  
From a methodological point of view this paper has emphasized how institutions affect the 
definition of the notion of model of capitalism. Of course, the analysis of the role of institutions on 
the functioning of markets for goods, capital and services and on the economic system as a whole is 
not new at all. Nowadays, whatever approach she/he decides to adopt, no economist would dream 
of denying the pivotal role played by institutions for the determination of the performances of 
markets. But in the analysis developed in this contribution institutions play a role which is quite at 
odds with other approaches for which institutions are a cornerstone. First of all, in our approach, 
institutions define the model of capitalism itself regardless of any interpretative economic model. 
This, of course, does not mean that micro and macro-economic models are irrelevant if one wants to 
understand and analyze the dynamics and the interactions of economic variables. But the complex 
and interrelated fabric of institutions which establish among themselves a complex cobweb of 
complementary relationships (positive or negative) provide the background on which the economic 
variables interact and affect each other. In this approach institutions are not only a constraint on the 
dynamics of economic variables or on their paths of quantitative adjustments. Institutions contribute 
to define the economic variables themselves in the sense that without institutions we would not be 
able to observe, for example, the interactions between demand and supply on a market for goods 
and services. Hence, in this sense, institutions can be considered as resources at disposal of 
economic actors and not simply as constraints to the behaviour of maximising individuals. In 
addition to that, institutions and the way these evolve explain the role of time and path dependence 
in the determination of economic variables; the level of a variable X at time t depends also on the 
level of a variable at time t-1 and affects what will occur to the variable at time t+1. History matters.  
This way to conceive institutions is consistent with Rehbein and Souza’s (2014, p. 20) approach, 
when, in their paper affirm: “Social structures, cultures and practices are subject to constant 
transformations and sometimes even revolutions. New institutions appear, old ones are done away 
with, new discourses emerge, economic crises erupt or oil is discovered. These transformations 
have an impact on the configurations of inequality. However, these do not appear out of the blue but 
literally are transformations of earlier configurations. Structures of inequality are relatively 
persistent. Aristocracy or working class, the value of a PhD or the reputation of doctors do not 
disappear overnight. The structures, on which they are based, change even slowlier, but they do 
change. Through social revolutions new cultural frameworks for inequality emerge. We refer to 
these frameworks as sociocultures. As sociocultures persist, so do forms of action or institutions 
that appear outdated. Monarchic rituals, bar associations, village structures or sociolects would be 
examples for this”. This approach is very close to our approach where the institutions and their 
relationships define the model of capitalism which, in turn, affect the level and the dynamics of 
income inequality.  
In this paper there is second methodological point which is worth mentioning and can be considered 
as another point of contact with Rehbein and Souza’s approach. As a matter of fact, despite we 
focus our attention on inequality in income distribution, we have claimed the relevance of 
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inequality as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Summarizing briefly what we said in the initial part 
of this contribution, we can say that we do not conceive inequality as unequal distribution of 
material resources, but also, at least, as unequal access to educational opportunities and/or to health 
services. This is very strictly related to the idea of social “milieux” developed by Vester and, later, 
adopted by Rehbein and Souza as the educational opportunities and the access to health services can 
be considered as a constituent element of the social milieux.  
Turning to the results obtained in the empirical analysis of inequality, the analysis allows to draw 
some preliminary conclusions about the alleged process of convergence in progress in both the EU 
and at a world level, as a consequence of the process of globalisation. As to the first point the 
empirical evidence outlined in this work shows that there is not a European model of capitalism and 
apparently European countries are not converging. This is quite surprising because in the interval 
between 1995-2010 the introduction of Euro pushed towards the convergence of fiscal policies. 
Apparently, this did not promote a process of convergence, as the discussion about labour markets 
in the EU and middle class decline has demonstrated. The EU policies did not manage to merge the 
different economies into a single model of capitalism. As to the effects of the process of 
globalisation, the empirical analysis developed in this paper has said nothing. Therefore, it seems to 
be extremely important to extend the analysis by focusing on emerging countries. One of the big 
questions is to understand if these countries are converging towards an existing model or if they are 
creating a new one. Does globalisation foster the convergence towards a single model, or does the 
path-dependency effect prevail with the creation of new and, at the moment, unpredictable models? 
An answer could be experimented only when we will be able to other explore other dimensions of 
inequality in terms of effects, while we already have been able to take into account of different 
dimensions in terms of determinants and basic characteristics, finding proper statistical indicators 
and proper data-bases. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Cluster Analysis 
 
The Cluster Analysis (CA) is an exploratory data analysis tool for organizing observed data (e.g. 
people, things, events, brands, companies) into meaningful taxonomies, groups, or clusters, based 
on combinations of certain variables that describe units’ characteristics, which maximizes the 
similarity of cases within each cluster while maximizing the dissimilarity between groups that are 
initially unknown. In this sense, CA creates new groupings without any notion of what clusters may 
arise. CA provides no explanation as to why the clusters exist nor is any interpretation made. Each 
cluster thus describes, in terms of the data collected, the class to which its members belong. Items in 
each cluster are similar in some ways to each other and dissimilar to those in other clusters. 
There are two basic approaches for generating a hierarchical clustering: i) agglomerative (are by far 
the most common techniques): start with two points as individual clusters and, at each step, merge 
the closest pair of clusters. This require defining a notion of cluster similarity or distance; ii) 
divisive: start with one all-inclusive cluster and, at each step, split a cluster until only a singleton 
clusters of individual points remain; in this case we need to decide which cluster to split at each step 
and how to do the splitting.  
Many agglomerative hierarchical clustering techniques are variation on a single approach: starting 
with individual point as clusters, successively merge the two closest clusters until one cluster 
remains. The merge of two clusters at each step is based on a measure of similarity or distance 
between the two cluster to be merged. The definition of cluster similarity differentiates the various 
agglomerative hierarchical techniques (for more detail see, for example, Everitt et al. 2001).  
In this application we use the WARD’s Minimum Variance Method, that assumes that a cluster is 
represented by its centroid and measures the distance between two cluster in terms of the increase in 
the within-clusters Sum of Squares (SSE) that result merging the two clusters. This methods 
attempts to minimize the sum of the squared distances of points from their cluster centroids.  
If we indicate as  the vector of the observed variables, in the Ward’s minimum-variance method 
the distance between two clusters K and L is defined by: 
 
 ! 
"# $ #!"

1
% 


1
%!
 
 
where "# $ #!"  is the square of the Euclidian distance between the centroids of the clusters K 
and L (the centroid is the mean vector in the group for all the variables), and %  and %! are the the 
number of observations in the clusters K and L. 
The distance between the two clusters is the ANOVA sum of squares (between-cluster sum of 
squares) between the two clusters added up over all the variables. At each generation, the within-
cluster sum of squares is minimized over all partitions obtainable by merging two clusters from the 
previous generation. The total sum of squares are easier to interpret when they are divided by the 
total sum of squares to give proportions of variance. At each step of the procedure, the square 
multiple correlation (R-square) is the proportion of total variance accounted for by the clusters. The 
semi-partial R-square represents the decrease in the proportion of variance accounted for by joining 
two clusters.  
When carrying out a hierarchical cluster analysis, the process can be represented on a diagram 
known as a dendrogram. This diagram illustrates which clusters have been joined at each stage of 
the analysis and the distance between clusters at the time of joining (this is usually the semi-partial 
R-square). If there is a large jump in the distance between clusters from one stage to another then 
this suggests that at one stage clusters that are relatively close together were joined whereas, at the 
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following stage, the clusters that were joined were relatively far apart. This implies that the 
optimum number of clusters may be the number present just before that large jump in distance. This 
is easier to understand by actually looking at the dendrogram, like the one reported in Figure 1 and 
2. The choice of the number of cluster to consider can be done visually looking at the dendrogram. 
A more formal rule for the choice of the number of clusters is those based on the pseudo F statistic 
calculated at each step of the procedure. The pseudo F statistic is the ratio of between-cluster to 
within-cluster sum of squares, divided respectively by the numbers g–1 and N–g, where g is the 
number of clusters. A relatively large value (compared to the preceding and the following values in 
the series) indicates a stopping point.  
 
 
TABLES 
 
Table A.1: Definition of institutional indicators 
 
Indicator Description and source 
  
Public expenditures on Active 
measures on Labour Market  
Public expenditures as a percentage of GDP on Active Labour market 
policies (Active measures (20-70):  Training - Employment incentives - 
Sheltered and supported employment and rehabilitation - Direct job 
creation- Start-up incentives): OECD Dataset: Public expenditure and 
participant stocks on LMP; 1985-2011 
Public expenditure on Passive 
Labour Market Policies  
( % GDP) 
Public expenditures as a percentage of GDP on Passive Labour market 
policies  (Out-of-work income maintenance and support - Early 
retirement): OECD Dataset: Public expenditure and participant stocks 
on LMP; 1985-2011 
Public unemployment 
expenditure (% GDP) 
Public unemployment expenditure % GDP: OECD Dataset: Social 
Expenditure - Aggregated data; 1995-2013 
Total public social expenditure 
(% GDP) 
Total public social expenditure % GDP: OECD Dataset: Social 
Expenditure - Aggregated data; 1995-2013 
Public expenditure on education 
(% on government expenditure) 
Public expenditure on education % on government expenditures: UN; 
1970-2012 (selected years and countries) 
Wage coordination Wage setting coordination indicator: WCoord of Visser (2009 ICTWSS 
data base). It is a five-point classification of wage-setting coordination 
scores, ranging from one (no coordination or fragmented bargaining) to 
five (economy-wide bargaining); 1985-2012. 
Trade union density Union density rate defined as the percentage of employees who are 
members of a trade union (OECD Employment Database); 1985-??   
Minimum wage/Median earning The ratio of minimum-to-median earnings. Minimum wages are 
measured relative to the median value of basic earnings (excluding 
overtime and bonus payments) of full-time employees: OECD 
Employment Database, 2000-2011. 
Average Tax wadge (%) Average Tax wadge (%) for a single person at 100 % of average 
earnings, no child; OECD: Taxing wages (comparative tables); 2000-
2012 
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Continue Table A.1 
 
Indicator Description and source 
  
Gross replacement ratio Gross replacement ratio - Gross replacement rates are calculated as 
gross unemployment benefit levels divided by previous gross earnings 
(average worker as reference); source OECD: Benefits and Wages 
database, 1995-2000 (yearly); 2001-2011 (every two years) 
Share of temporary employment Share of temporary employment;  OECD LFS dataset: “Employment by 
Permanency”; 1995-2012 
Employment protection Employment protection indicator (regular contracts): OECD 
Employment Database; 1985-2013 
Temporary employment 
protection 
Employment protection indicator (temporary contracts): OECD 
Employment Database; 1985-2013 
Product market Protection - State 
Control 
Product Market Regulation index: State control;  OECD PMR indicators 
database, 1998-2003-2008 
Product market Protection - 
Barrier to entrepreneurship 
Product Market Regulation index: Barrier to entrepreneurship; OECD 
PMR indicators database, 1998-2003-2008 
Product market Protection - 
Barrier to trade and investments 
Product Market Regulation index: Barriers to trade and investments; 
OECD PMR indicators database, 1998-2003-2008 
Domestic credit provided by 
banking sector (% of GDP) 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP): includes all 
credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to 
the central government. The banking sector includes monetary 
authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other banking 
institutions. World Bank, JOBS database; 1995-2011 
Domestic credit to private sector 
(% of GDP) 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP): financial resources 
provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-
equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that 
establish a claim for repayment: World Bank, JOBS database; 1995-
2011 
Bank concentration (%) Bank concentration (%):World Bank, Global financial indicators 
database; 1995-2011 
Percentage of foreign banks 
among total banks (%) 
Percentage of foreign banks among total banks (%):World Bank, Global 
financial indicators database; 1995-2011 
Stock market capitalization to 
GDP (%) 
Stock market capitalization to GDP (%):Total value of all listed shares 
in a stock market as a percentage of GDP; World Bank, Global financial 
indicators database; 1995-2011 
Stock market total value traded to 
GDP (%) 
Stock market total value traded to GDP (%): Stocks traded refers to the 
total value of shares traded during the period. This indicator 
complements the market capitalization ratio by showing whether market 
size is matched by trading. World Bank, Global financial indicators 
database; 1995-2011 
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Continue Table A.1 
 
Indicator Description and source 
  
Stock market turnover ratio 
(value traded/capitalization) (%) 
Stock market turnover ratio (value traded/capitalization) (%): total value 
of shares traded during the period divided by the average market 
capitalization for the period. Average market capitalization is calculated 
as the average of the end-of-period values for the current period and the 
previous period: World Bank, Global financial indicators database; 
1995-2011 
Average income tax rate (%) Average income tax rate (%);income taxes paid by workers divided the 
earning of the Average Worker for a single person at 100% of average 
earnings, no child; OECD Taxing wages dataset; 2000-2012. 
Net personal marginal tax rate: 
Principal earner (%) 
Net personal marginal tax rate: Principal earner (%); OECD Taxing 
wages dataset; 2000-2012 
Marginal tax wedge: Principal 
earner (%) 
Marginal tax wedge: Principal earner (%); OECD Taxing wages dataset; 
2000-2012 
Total tax revenue on GDP Total tax revenue on GDP; OECD Revenue statistics – Comparatives 
Series dataset; 1995-2012 
Taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains (% total tax) 
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% total tax); OECD 
Revenue statistics – Comparatives Series dataset; 1995-2012 
Social security contributions (% 
total tax) 
Social security contributions (% total tax); OECD Revenue statistics – 
Comparatives Series dataset; 1995-2012 
Taxes on goods and services (% 
total tax) 
Taxes on goods and services (% total tax); OECD Revenue statistics – 
Comparatives Series dataset; 1995-2012 
Gross domestic expenditure on 
R&D (% of GDP) 
GERD (Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D) as a percentage of GDP: 
OECD Main Science and technology indicators Dataset; 1995-2011 
Total researchers per thousand 
total employment 
Total researchers per thousand total employment : OECD Main Science 
and technology indicators Dataset; 1995-2011 
Percentage of GERD financed by 
government 
Percentage of GERD financed by government: OECD Main Science and 
technology indicators Dataset; 1995-2011 
Percentage of GERD financed by 
private sector 
Percentage of GERD financed by private sector: OECD Main Science 
and technology indicators Dataset; 1995-2011 
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Table A.2. Cluster history, 1995 
Number 
of 
clusters 
Clusters joined Freq Semipartial 
R-square 
R-square Pseudo F 
statistic 
 
Pseudo  
t-square 
        
23 Australia Canada 2 0.0073 0.993 6.2 . 
22 Finland Sweden 2 0.01 0.983 5.4 . 
21 Austria Germany 2 0.0106 0.972 5.2 . 
20 Czech Republic Slovakia 2 0.0107 0.961 5.2 . 
19 CL23 United Kingdom 3 0.0164 0.945 4.8 2.2 
18 CL21 Italy 3 0.0166 0.928 4.6 1.6 
17 CL18 France 4 0.0189 0.91 4.4 1.4 
16 CL22 Norway 3 0.0217 0.888 4.2 2.2 
15 CL19 United States 4 0.024 0.864 4.1 2 
14 Denmark CL16 4 0.026 0.838 4 1.6 
13 Portugal Spain 2 0.0269 0.811 3.9 . 
12 Belgium Netherlands 2 0.0271 0.784 4 . 
11 CL20 Poland 3 0.0301 0.754 4 2.8 
10 Japan Switzerland 2 0.0307 0.723 4.1 . 
9 CL17 CL12 6 0.033 0.69 4.2 1.8 
8 Hungary Ireland 2 0.037 0.653 4.3 . 
7 CL11 CL13 5 0.0454 0.608 4.4 2 
6 CL7 CL8 7 0.0512 0.556 4.5 1.7 
5 CL10 Korea 3 0.0519 0.504 4.8 1.7 
4 CL9 CL14 10 0.079 0.425 4.9 3.9 
3 CL15 CL5 7 0.079 0.346 5.6 3 
2 CL4 CL6 17 0.1229 0.224 6.3 4.1 
1 CL3 CL2 24 0.2235 0 . 6.3 
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Table A.3. Cluster history, 2010 
Number 
of cluster 
Clusters Joined Freq Semipartial 
R-square 
R-square Pseudo F 
Statistic 
Pseudo  
t-squared 
        
23 Austria Germany 2 0.0072 0.993 6.2 . 
22 Canada United Kingdom 2 0.0078 0.985 6.2 . 
21 Czech Republic Slovakia 2 0.0089 0.976 6.1 . 
20 Netherlands Portugal 2 0.0122 0.964 5.6 . 
19 Australia CL22 3 0.0127 0.951 5.4 1.6 
18 Finland Sweden 2 0.0134 0.938 5.3 . 
17 CL23 Italy 3 0.0163 0.921 5.1 2.3 
16 CL20 Spain 3 0.019 0.902 4.9 1.6 
15 CL21 Hungary 3 0.0228 0.879 4.7 2.6 
14 France CL16 4 0.0238 0.856 4.6 1.5 
13 CL18 Norway 3 0.0239 0.832 4.5 1.8 
12 Denmark CL13 4 0.027 0.805 4.5 1.4 
11 CL19 United States 4 0.0278 0.777 4.5 2.7 
10 CL11 Switzerland 5 0.0316 0.745 4.6 2 
9 Japan Korea 2 0.0357 0.71 4.6 . 
8 CL15 Poland 4 0.0365 0.673 4.7 2.3 
7 CL14 Ireland 5 0.0375 0.636 4.9 2.1 
6 CL17 Belgium 4 0.0423 0.593 5.3 3.6 
5 CL10 CL9 7 0.0533 0.54 5.6 2.3 
4 CL6 CL12 8 0.0591 0.481 6.2 2.7 
3 CL4 CL7 13 0.0902 0.391 6.7 3.5 
2 CL3 CL8 17 0.1755 0.215 6 6 
1 CL5 CL2 24 0.2153 0 . 6 
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Table A.4 Cluster Averages for each indicator, 1995 
 
 CLUSTER 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Public expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies ( % on GDP) 0.44 1.49 0.72 0.26 0.27 
Average income tax rate (%) 12.54 27.29 18.31 6.66 20.18 
Bank concentration (%) 64.38 87.68 61.92 54.05 42.76 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) 69.25 71.88 116.73 169.07 121.60 
Product market Protection - Barrier to entrepreneurship 2.27 2.04 2.44 2.74 1.59 
Product market Protection - Barrier to trade and investments 1.59 0.57 0.54 1.36 0.45 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 49.78 61.48 83.49 138.08 102.61 
Public expenditure on education (% on government expenditure) 12.42 13.13 8.93 14.25 12.89 
Employment protection 2.78 2.44 2.87 2.18 1.48 
Temporary employment protection 1.45 1.88 3.14 1.98 0.41 
Percentage of foreign banks among total banks (%) 40.00 4.25 17.67 8.67 33.50 
Percentage of GERD financed by private sector 49.10 57.33 52.67 75.99 55.52 
Taxes on goods and services (% total tax) 36.63 32.27 27.40 25.99 26.91 
Gross replacement ratio 19.36 41.68 34.43 16.48 18.97 
Net personal marginal tax rate: Principal earner (%) 39.13 50.25 48.18 19.85 36.38 
Marginal tax wedge: Principal earner (%) 52.04 57.28 59.96 26.20 41.93 
Minimum wage/Median earning 0.35 0.00 0.27 0.18 0.35 
Public expenditure on Passive Labour Market Policies ( % on 
GDP) 
1.28 2.88 1.99 0.53 0.91 
Total public social expenditure (% GDP) 19.49 28.75 25.37 11.61 17.63 
Public unemployment expenditure (% GDP) 1.39 2.93 1.85 0.54 0.93 
Product market Protection - State Control 3.42 2.80 3.48 2.94 1.83 
Share of temporary employment 12.35 14.50 8.69 15.83 6.99 
Social security contributions (% total tax) 31.68 21.04 37.36 24.28 14.18 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.82 2.26 1.77 2.59 1.92 
Total researchers per thousand total employment 3.37 7.49 5.33 6.82 6.77 
Percentage of GERD financed by government 44.98 36.72 40.83 22.94 37.47 
Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 16.85 39.79 33.77 76.00 80.04 
Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 5.42 19.36 20.16 53.15 39.71 
Stock market turnover ratio (value traded/capitalization) (%) 41.47 50.23 63.90 69.68 54.55 
Total tax revenue on GDP 35.36 45.70 41.06 24.45 31.40 
Trade union density 36.53 74.47 32.63 19.72 28.29 
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% total tax) 28.10 43.07 28.76 37.31 46.19 
Average Tax wedge (%) 40.30 45.15 49.13 21.17 31.78 
Wage coordination 2.43 3.50 3.67 4.00 1.25 
Countries Czech R. 
Slovakia 
Portugal 
Spain 
Poland 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Finland 
Sweden 
Norway 
Denmark 
Austria 
Germany 
Italy 
France 
Belgium 
Netherl. 
Japan 
Switzter. 
Korea 
Australia 
Canada 
UK 
USA 
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Table A.5: Between and within-cluster deviance, 1995 
 
Indicator Within 
cluster 
SS 
Between 
cluster 
SS 
Total 
SS 
Between 
SS 
% 
Total tax revenue on GDP 260.16 1012.53 1272.69 79.6 
Average Tax wedge (%) 649.32 1935.6 2584.92 74.9 
Total public social expenditure (% GDP) 252.96 679.87 932.83 72.9 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 3.71 9.23 12.94 71.3 
Marginal tax wedge: Principal earner (%) 1263.6 2796.31 4059.91 68.9 
Trade union density 3348.25 6882.86 10231.11 67.3 
Public expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies ( % on GDP) 2.02 4.14 6.16 67.2 
Total researchers per thousand total employment 33.91 59.36 93.27 63.6 
Employment protection 3.56 5.87 9.43 62.2 
Wage coordination 12.8 21.04 33.84 62.2 
Average income tax rate (%) 575.25 933.89 1509.14 61.9 
Product market Protection - State Control 5.94 8.28 14.22 58.2 
Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 10330.06 14093.99 24424.05 57.7 
Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 4981.86 6108.8 11090.66 55.1 
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% total tax) 1234.91 1343.67 2578.58 52.1 
Net personal marginal tax rate: Principal earner (%) 1962.54 2093.91 4056.45 51.6 
Social security contributions (% total tax) 1672.14 1613.43 3285.57 49.1 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 21075.79 20001.33 41077.12 48.7 
Bank concentration (%) 4598.88 4334.67 8933.55 48.5 
Public expenditure on Passive Labour Market Policies ( % on GDP) 16.22 13.46 29.68 45.4 
Gross replacement ratio 2806.22 2183.49 4989.71 43.8 
Temporary employment protection 26.59 19.44 46.03 42.2 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) 39002.82 27453.69 66456.51 41.3 
Product market Protection - Barrier to entrepreneurship 4.21 2.88 7.09 40.6 
Public unemployment expenditure (% GDP) 19.18 12.9 32.08 40.2 
Percentage of foreign banks among total banks (%) 7185.75 4652.21 11837.96 39.3 
Public expenditure on education (% on government expenditure) 128.23 81.42 209.65 38.8 
Percentage of GERD financed by private sector 2620.97 1605.51 4226.48 38.0 
Taxes on goods and services (% total tax) 728.38 445.03 1173.41 37.9 
Product market Protection - Barrier to trade and investments 11.96 5.96 17.92 33.3 
Percentage of GERD financed by government 2204.99 1069.94 3274.93 32.7 
Minimum wage/Median earning 0.87 0.37 1.24 29.8 
Share of temporary employment 883.76 224.99 1108.75 20.3 
Stock market turnover ratio (value traded/capitalization) (%) 11202.57 2482.16 13684.73 18.1 
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Table A.6. Cluster averages for each indicator, 2010 
 CLUSTER 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Public expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies (% 
on GDP) 
0.40 0.75 0.91 0.70 0.32 0.20 
Average income tax rate (%) 10.18 13.53 22.37 20.85 6.07 16.13 
Bank concentration (%) 63.08 73.23 90.91 70.47 47.58 60.29 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) 65.45 204.32 136.19 135.07 215.54 192.14 
PMR - Barrier to entrepreneurship 1.78 1.14 1.16 1.25 1.25 1.11 
PMR - Barrier to trade and investments 0.79 0.17 0.37 0.54 0.96 0.23 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 54.67 186.77 133.22 111.61 136.60 165.72 
Public expenditure on education (% on government 
expenditure) 
10.36 10.71 13.98 10.86 12.59 13.35 
Employment protection 2.56 2.74 2.33 2.94 2.07 1.68 
Temporary employment protection 1.45 2.03 1.69 1.67 1.50 0.58 
Percentage of foreign banks among total banks (%) 78.75 35.00 8.50 20.25 12.50 38.60 
Percentage of GERD financed by private sector 40.26 51.34 59.70 55.57 77.71 61.99 
Taxes on goods and services (% total tax) 37.94 31.76 30.10 27.24 26.30 24.82 
Gross replacement ratio 8.72 35.41 33.80 24.10 10.41 19.76 
Net personal marginal tax rate: Principal earner (%) 35.36 33.83 40.59 49.89 23.87 32.89 
Marginal tax wedge: Principal earner (%) 48.30 46.20 48.82 60.96 31.85 38.08 
Minimum wage/Median earning 0.43 0.51 0.00 0.13 0.39 0.37 
Public expenditure on Passive Labour Market Policies 
(on GDP) 
0.51 2.14 1.21 1.61 0.35 0.63 
Total public social expenditure (% GDP) 21.16 26.33 27.87 28.30 15.76 20.17 
Public unemployment expenditure (% GDP) 0.73 2.04 1.35 1.83 0.39 0.68 
PMR - State Control 2.33 1.97 1.84 2.21 1.71 1.62 
Share of temporary employment 12.90 18.20 11.90 11.22 18.39 8.50 
Social security contributions (% total tax) 38.60 32.29 19.85 34.32 31.96 16.76 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.02 1.76 3.01 2.21 3.50 2.31 
Total researchers per thousand total employment 5.52 7.87 12.79 7.43 10.63 8.07 
Percentage of GERD financed by government 47.43 39.79 31.74 33.95 21.96 31.65 
Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 21.48 58.19 69.88 31.66 85.09 142.96 
Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 10.91 51.64 58.75 24.56 123.80 149.25 
Stock market turnover ratio (%) 43.77 76.27 85.94 101.10 135.71 102.86 
Total tax revenue on GDP 33.03 34.55 44.63 41.12 26.35 28.88 
Trade union density 16.42 18.81 65.37 33.25 13.98 20.07 
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% total tax) 19.73 28.26 44.86 31.05 29.21 46.25 
Average Tax wedge (%) 40.21 38.11 40.16 50.12 25.19 28.39 
Wage coordination 1.75 3.20 3.75 4.00 3.50 1.60 
       
Countries Czech R. 
Slovakia 
Hungary 
Poland 
Netherl. 
Portugal 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Finland 
Sweden 
Norway 
Denmark 
Austria 
Germany 
Italy 
Belgium 
Japan 
Korea 
Canada 
UK 
Australia 
USA 
Switzerl. 
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Table A.7. Between and within-cluster deviance, 2010 
 
Indicator Within 
cluster 
SS 
Between 
cluster 
SS 
Total 
SS 
Between  
SS 
% 
Trade union density 1242.68 7358.54 8601.22 85.55 
Gross replacement ratio 638.43 2420.58 3059.01 79.13 
Taxes on income, profits and capital gains (% total tax) 781.18 2281.47 3062.65 74.49 
Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 14765.9 43054.5 57820.4 74.46 
Total tax revenue on GDP 323.1 872.89 1195.99 72.98 
Average Tax wedge (%) 572.14 1414.3 1986.44 71.20 
Wage coordination 10 22.63 32.63 69.35 
Average income tax rate (%) 284.87 615.7 900.57 68.37 
Total researchers per thousand total employment 60.76 125.56 186.32 67.39 
Minimum wage/Median earning 0.4 0.81 1.21 66.94 
Total public social expenditure (% GDP) 204.73 401.81 606.54 66.25 
Public expenditure on Passive Labour Market Policies ( % on GDP) 5.15 10.1 15.25 66.23 
Marginal tax wedge: Principal earner (%) 846.88 1655.09 2501.97 66.15 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 6.47 12.57 19.04 66.02 
Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 33794.62 61497.06 95291.68 64.54 
Employment protection 2.61 4.7 7.31 64.30 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 26084.03 46136.21 72220.24 63.88 
Percentage of GERD financed by private sector 1306.28 2276.71 3582.99 63.54 
Percentage of foreign banks among total banks (%) 7280.2 12400.76 19680.96 63.01 
Product market Protection - Barrier to entrepreneurship 0.79 1.31 2.1 62.38 
Public expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies ( % on GDP) 1.24 1.62 2.86 56.64 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) 48006.35 61398.01 109404.4 56.12 
Net personal marginal tax rate: Principal earner (%) 969.63 1205.71 2175.34 55.43 
Bank concentration (%) 3040.21 3453.77 6493.98 53.18 
Social security contributions (% total tax) 1437.73 1627.94 3065.67 53.10 
Public expenditure on education (% on government expenditure) 46.01 49.58 95.59 51.87 
Percentage of GERD financed by government 1118.33 1167.98 2286.31 51.09 
Taxes on goods and services (% total tax) 446.59 459.38 905.97 50.71 
Product market Protection - Barrier to trade and investments 1.77 1.67 3.44 48.55 
Public unemployment expenditure (% GDP) 12.15 8.7 20.85 41.73 
Stock market turnover ratio (value traded/capitalization) (%) 29259.99 14852.37 44112.36 33.67 
Share of temporary employment 633.41 311.93 945.34 33.00 
Temporary employment protection 12.12 5.9 18.02 32.74 
Product market Protection - State Control 5.02 1.55 6.57 23.59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
